The End of WESTERN HEGEMONIES?

THE 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
BY THE WEST NETWORK

5 - 7 JUNE 2019
Main Building (C), University of Jyväskylä

keynote speakers
Riccardo Bavarj
Cecelia Lynch

Roundtable discussion lead by
Marie-Josée Lavallée

www.thewestnetwork.org
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Abstracts</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map &amp; Contact info</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The West Network Conference 2019

The End of Western Hegemonies?

While some pretend that the West is an imaginary construction, many modern developments, which have affected the social, cultural, political, economic, intellectual and spiritual life of societies throughout the world in different ways and to varying degrees are said to be “Western inventions”. Convinced of their inherent superiority, the handful of countries which claimed to be the cradle of phenomena as industrialization, modern science, free markets, technology individualism, hyperconsumerism, Christianity, rationalism, secularism, liberalism, and democracy have spread or imposed them to other cultures through strategies like diffusionism, direct and indirect imperialism, sometimes with the help of military strength. This multidisciplinary conference intends to explore areas in which Western hegemonies have manifest themselves, and to evaluate their impacts and the responses they generated. It will also open paths of reflection on their future. Are these hegemonies still strong, or already in decline? Will they endure? Will they be replaced by new hegemonies, or give way to more complex, plural, configurations?

The organizers:

Jukka Jouhki, Department of History and Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä

Marie-Josée Lavallée, Department of History, University of Montreal and Department of Philosophy and Applied Ethics, University of Sherbrooke, Canada

Assisted by Antero Holmila, Iina Honkakoski, Veera Keto, Tytti Leiwo (+ cover design), Katariina Murtolahti, Quivine Ndomo (+ program booklet), Matti Roitto, Petra Suonperä
**Program**

**Conference Venue:** University of Jyväskylä Main Building (C) & Building P

**DAY 1, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>VENUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:00 – 13:30</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Entrance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30 – 13:45</td>
<td>Welcome</td>
<td>C5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45 – 15:00</td>
<td>Keynote</td>
<td>C5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 17:15</td>
<td>Panels 1</td>
<td>C5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1 Hegemonies of the United States (Part 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tereza Kuldova <em>(chair)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:00</td>
<td>Anna Kronlund: Dissenting views about climate change and U.S. global leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00 – 16:30</td>
<td>Annariina Seppänen: The left in the rhetoric of the United States Republican Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30 – 17:00</td>
<td>Anni Calcara: The end of evangelical politics? Conflict between the evangelical ideology as portrayed by evangelical popular culture, and political climate of the United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00 – 17:15</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:15 – 17:45</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:45 – 19:30</td>
<td>Panels 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1 Cultures, Subcultures, and Counter-Hegemonies</td>
<td>C4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Jukka Jouhki (chair)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:45 – 18:15</td>
<td>Xenia Zeiler: Mediatized popular culture in India as ‘game changer’ Challenging ‘Western’ hegemonies in video games</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:15 – 18:45</td>
<td>Tereza Kuldova: Anti-establishment resentment in Germany: From support to the Hells Angels MC to the love of the Russian Night Wolves MC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:45 – 19:00</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:45 – 18:15</td>
<td>2.2 China and the West</td>
<td>C5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Pekka Korhonen (chair)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:45 – 18:15</td>
<td>Dorothée Vandamme: The Chinese alternative: Socializing states into compatible roles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:15 – 18:45</td>
<td>Matti Puranen: Post-Western visions from the East: Tianxia and the Chinese alternative conception of world politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DAY 2, THURSDAY, JUNE 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>VENUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:30 – 10:00</td>
<td>\textit{Ledio Albani}: Cosmopolitanism: A philosophical concept between utopia and European hegemony</td>
<td>C4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00 – 10:30</td>
<td>\textit{Marie-Josée Lavallée}: The future of democracy: Can the West still pretend to lead?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 – 11:00</td>
<td>\textit{Ville Suuronen}: The remaking of global order after World War I: Carl Schmitt’s Grossraumordnung and Hannah Arendt’s federalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 – 11:15</td>
<td>\textbf{Discussion}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15 – 11:45</td>
<td>\textbf{Coffee}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45 – 13:00</td>
<td>\textit{Riccardo Bavaj}</td>
<td>C4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00 – 14:00</td>
<td>\textbf{Lunch}</td>
<td>Lozzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 – 15:45</td>
<td>\textbf{Panels 4}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 – 14:30</td>
<td>\textit{Sofia Kotilainen}: The historical multicultural turn in the Finnish name legislation: traditional Christianity meets the global interaction</td>
<td>C4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30 – 15:00</td>
<td>\textit{Helena Oikarinen-Jabai}: Young Finnish people of Muslim background researching their spaces and sense of belonging</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>\textit{Anouar El Younssi}: Is Islam an existential threat to the West?</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:30 – 15:45</td>
<td>\textbf{Discussion}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 – 14:30</td>
<td>\textit{Jussi Backman}: A Eurasian challenge to Western liberal hegemony: On Aleksandr Dugin’s radical conservatism</td>
<td>C5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30 – 15:00</td>
<td>\textit{Abhilash Thadathil}: Western Neo-liberalism and Adivasi self-rule: Experiences from India’s tribal heartland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>\textit{Hae Seong Jang}: Epistemological challenges within the restoration of indigenous knowledge in Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 15:45</td>
<td>\textbf{Discussion}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15:45 – 16:15  Coffee
16:15 – 18:00  Panels 5

5.1 The East and the West

- Anna Kronlund (chair)  C4
16:15 – 16:45  Chloé Lala-Guyard: Terrorism and the end of Western hegemonies: A Gramscian perspective
16:45 – 17:15  Niki Sopanen: Crouching (paper) tiger, hidden (paper) dragon, and the clash of the conspiratorial turn? A post-foundational inquiry into foreign political conspiracy theory discourses in Sino-U.S. relations since the events of Tiananmen
17:15 – 17:45  Pekka Korhonen: Passing of the idea of Japan as a bridge between the East and the West
17:45 – 18:00  Discussion

5.2 Theories / Narratives

- Matti Puranen (chair)  C5
16:15 – 16:45  Iuliia Gataulina: Postsocialism(s) as assemblage: Conducting research without recreating power relations
16:45 – 17:15  Iris-Aya Laemmerhirt: Writing your own history. The importance of refugee narratives in a transnational context
17:15 – 17:45  Marja Vuorinen: A European Turn in the Western narrative of ideal society?
17:45 – 18:15  Discussion

18:30  Pre-Dinner Walking Tour (optional)  Harju
19:30  Dinner  Harald

DAY 3, FRIDAY, JUNE 7

TIME  EVENT  VENUE
Panels 6

6.1 Race and Gender

- Marja Vuorinen (chair)  C4
9:30 – 10:00  Martin James Pallister: Gender: The first fake news
10:00 – 10:30  Yuko Kawai: Race and nation in inter-East Asian friendships made in the West
10:30 – 10:45  Discussion

6.2 The West and the Middle East

- Antero Holmila (chair)  C5
9:30 – 10:00  Ann-Judith Rabenschlag: The end of Western hegemony? German perceptions of the Oil Crisis of 1973
10:00 – 10:30  William Guéraiche: Challenging the Western hegemony: Changing the paradigm of diplomacy in the Gulf State
10:30 – 10:45  Discussion
10:45 – 11:15  Coffee
11:15 – 12:30  Round Table: The Future of the Local in the Era of the Global  C5
- Marie-Josée Lavallée (chair)
Participants: Antero Holmila, Hae Seong Jang, Cecelia Lynch, Abhilash Thadathil, Xenia Zeiler
12:30 – 12:45  Conclusion  C5
13:00 – 13:45  Tourist train from venue via Center to Jyväskyla Harbor  s/s Suomi
14:00 – 17:00  Lunch Cruise  s/s Suomi
KEYNOTE: BANISH “THE LOCAL”!: TOWARDS... THE PLURIVERSE, GLOBALECTICS?
DE-CENTERING “THE WEST” IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Cecelia Lynch
University of California, Irvine
Fulbright Scholar 2019, Tampere University

In this talk, I discuss how working on religion, ethics, and humanitarianism has pushed me to address race, decoloniality, and indigeneity, and understand something of the persistence, power and contributions of “non-western” knowledge and practices. Intersecting fields, including that of international relations, are increasingly addressing these sites for interrogating knowledge claims and processes of knowledge construction. Two parallel moves are also in process: a) the resort to “the local” in contemporary work, for example on humanitarianism and transitional justice, as important sites of knowledge and practice, and 2) the crafting of new terminology (the pluriverse; globalectics) to conceptualize the rich contributions of the “non-west” as well as their interconnections with dominant western ones. Drawing on my own research on religion and humanitarianism in different parts of the world, I assert that these moves are, in the end, incompatible, that we need to banish the anthropological distinctions of “local/global”, and push forward conceptualizations that challenge the ongoing power of western hegemony.

The field of international relations (IR) has increasingly addressed issues of race and religion. Studies of knowledge claims, histories, traditions, and politics from non-European and non-North American parts of the world are increasing; while studies of the racialized Eurocentric origins and development of the field are also on the rise. IR scholars of decoloniality are also actively reconceptualizing the importance of numerous aspects of indigeneity to challenge dominant forms of knowledge claims. These works are crucial for any ongoing decentering of the west. Relatedly, a group of decolonial scholars in other fields have crafted and are debating the term “pluriverse” to acknowledge the multiplicity of cosmologies and forms of knowledge as a challenge to western (and some non-western) universalizing claims, and eminent writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o has put forth the term “globalectics” to encompass the interconnections in the production of knowledge between oral and written cultures.

Engaging in research on humanitarianism, ethics, and religion in different parts of Africa, the Middle East, Europe and the U.S. entails analyzing the dominance of ongoing “western” power structures of aid, and imaginaries of aid recipients. But it also demonstrates the persistence and power of multiple religious traditions and religio-cultural syncretisms that both reinforce and resist such structures and imaginaries. It has been too tempting to relegate these resistances to “the local.” What happens if we instead seek their implicit and explicit interconnections? What knowledge claims are disturbed; what other claims are advanced?
What are the implications for humanitarianism, aid, and the representation of the “aid beneficiary” as subject?


**KEYNOTE: BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY AND CONTAINER CONCEPT: WESTERN SELF-ASSERTIONS, GERMAN WESTERNIZERS, AND THE SPATIALIZATION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT**

Riccardo Bavaj
University of St. Andrews

The “end of Western hegemonies” goes hand-in-hand with a remarkable resilience if not resurgence of ‘the West’ as a socio-political concept: firstly, “the West” continues to be a highly popular and effective framing device, and secondly, there is a perseverance of hegemonic notions of ‘the West’ that have a long tradition, with origins in the early nineteenth century (and what the German historian Reinhart Koselleck called the Sattelzeit). ‘Western hegemones’ may have ended in various areas of life, but “the West” as a rhetorical pattern is very much alive. What current debates show, in fact, is that the concept of ‘the West’ proves useful even, and perhaps especially, when commentators lament its “crisis”, “decline”, “twilight”, or “end”. Indeed, one could argue that the greatest threat to “the West” as a socio-political concept is the lack of any threat – it does tend to be in fashion when confronted with “internal” or “external” threats that are considered anti-“Western”.

8
The lecture first provides a brief overview of examples of Western self-assertion, and attempts to stabilize “Western identity”, as well as examples of self-positionings “beyond the West”, and attempts to dismantle the “Western paradigm”. Second, it outlines an analytical framework, and explores two main semantic dimensions of the concept of the West: an open-ended evolutionary concept and a spatially-confined container concept. It also examines the function, appeal and usefulness of the concept: “The West” is not only a cipher for political values, cultural norms, and religious traditions; it is also an effective rhetorical tool to mobilize people for a cause, and to forge national, as well as transnational, identities. This part of the lecture refers repeatedly to the work of the most prominent advocate of “the West” in Germany, Heinrich August Winkler, esp. The History of the West and Germany’s Long Road West.

Third, and finally, the lecture explores the ‘Westernization’ of the political thought of two rémigré thinkers (i.e. scholars who emigrated from Germany in the 1930s and returned to Germany after the war), who proved highly influential for the formation of Winkler’s historical and political thinking: Ernst Fraenkel and Richard Löwenthal. This final part seeks to explore the rationale behind the spatialization of political thought, and addresses the question of when, how and why these two scholars appropriated the spatio-political concept of the West.

The lecture makes the following points:

1) In the discourse on “the West”, there is often a tension at play between an open-ended evolutionary concept and a spatially confined container concept. The evolutionary concept implies a universal trajectory and a standard of civilizational progress (in terms of social norms, technical advance, economic development, and political values) that, in principle, is attainable by every part of the world. The underlying assumption is the existence of one single universal civilization that originates in the West, with a special emphasis on the “Atlantic revolutions” of the late eighteenth century, and a cluster of norms and ideas centred on human rights, the rule of law, separation of powers, and parliamentary democracy. The container concept, instead, is largely defined along cultural, religious, linguistic and also ethnic lines; it is, therefore, constituted by features that, even in principle, are much less universalizable. This concept implies a plurality of civilizations with different trajectories and only a limited degree of convergence. The classic example would be the notion of a “historical West”, or “the Occident” (Abendland in German), as an area dominated by Latin Christianity, as opposed to the world of Eastern Orthodoxy.

2) Both conceptual variants – evolutionary concept / container concept – are not mutually exclusive but often coexist in varying degrees of conflation, which create tensions between “the West’s” universality and “Western” particularities, typically limiting the universalizability of “Western ideas”. Sometimes, the drawing of civilizational boundaries remains implicit and works more like an unspoken assumption; sometimes it is made explicit – for instance, when commenting on the war in eastern Ukraine or Russian politics in general; the question of Turkey’s accession to the EU would be another example.

3) When exploring the question of why historical actors have found the concept of the West so useful and effective to articulate their political views, one needs to consider the spatiality of the concept. Spatial concepts – once they metamorphose into socio-political ones (for “the West”, that happened in the early nineteenth century) – are distinct from non-spatial ones in
their specific ability, namely by homogenizing space, to reduce complexity, create orientation, and shape identities. They evoke an “imagined community” (Benedict Anderson), and create a sense of cultural, historical and ideological cohesion, which is attached to a certain geographical area. Sometimes, the boundaries of this area are defined very clearly; often, they are amorphous, and they also tend to shift over time.

4) When examining the ways in which the political thought of Ernst Fraenkel and Richard Löwenthal spatialized (i.e. incorporated and/or modified spatio-political frameworks), a number of arguments can be put forward: Fraenkel – a left-socialist labour law expert in the Weimar Republic, who had fled Nazi persecution in 1938 and had spent most of his exile in the United States – returned to Germany in 1951 as a vocal advocate of U.S. constitutionalism, but he only became an avowed “Westernizer” in the early 1960s. A conceptual Westernization only occurred in the academic environment of the Free University Berlin, with its direct exposition to the front line of the Cold War. The frequent use of the term “Western democracy” from 1960 onward was part of Fraenkel’s art of persuasion. The conflation of a spatial concept and a key word of political thought allowed him to anchor West Germany’s political culture firmly in the realm of pluralist democracies, effectively making a case for its democratization. Moreover, the question of Germany’s historical relationship to ‘the West’ – usually framed as the question of a German Special Path (Sonderweg) – featured increasingly prominently on the academic agenda in the mid and late 1950s, and it was a logical step for Fraenkel, “primed” by his Weimar background, to engage with the critical Special Path discourse on German anti-“Westernism”. As the notion of a fundamental dichotomy between Germany and “the West” still fuelled what Fraenkel and others saw as a German “special consciousness”, both the term “Western democracies” and Germany’s relationship to that spatio-political construct needed to be redefined, and the imaginary geography of “Western democracies” needed expanding.

Lastly, Fraenkel’s increasing determination to help transform West Germany’s political culture manifested itself, around 1960, in a shift in spatial identity. The self-declared “American in Berlin”, who had sworn never to use the word ‘we’ again because he could never any more identify himself with “the Germans”, suddenly switched to the “we” form again, and this was just around the time he started to avail himself of the language of “Western democracy”. He was still proud of his U.S. citizenship, but from 1960 onward he spoke of “we – the Germans”. The full incorporation of the concept of the West into his rhetorical register allowed Fraenkel to solve an identity dilemma: instead of choosing between two national identities (American or German), he transformed into a German-American “Westerner”.

Fraenkel’s colleague Richard Löwenthal became a “Westerner” as well. He started off as the member of a Communist student association in the Weimar Republic, and found himself signing up, in 1950, as a founding member of the Congress for Cultural Freedom – a decidedly anti-Communist organization, and a major conduit of transatlantic cultural transfer that spread ideas of Cold War liberalism and “Western Civilization”. Three factors stand out when accounting for this intellectual transformation: first, the shock waves sent out by the Soviet Union; second, Löwenthal’s time in exile in London; and third, the emerging spatial logic of the Cold War in 1946-47, which prompted him to discard his previous preference for a socialist Europe as a “third force”. From then on, one of the key characteristics of his spatio-political framework was a container-space rhetoric that distinguished between a dynamic, creative “Western” and a static, “invertebrate” “Eastern civilization”.

10
Löwenthal’s concept of the West was influenced both by Max Weber and the British historian Arnold Toynbee, who reached the height of his fame in the aftermath of the Second World War – at a time when the frequency of references to “Western civilization” soared. Toynbee’s gargantuan, multi-volume study of world civilizations advanced the theory that “Western civilization”, alongside twenty other civilizations in world history, was an “intelligible unit of historical study” – a statement that was repeatedly quoted by Löwenthal. When Löwenthal tried to make sense of the rapid transformation of industrially advanced pluralist societies from the mid and late 1960s, he resorted to a political language that was shot through with Toynbeean notions of “rhythms”, “crises”, and “breakdowns” of civilizations. For Löwenthal, the disaffection of the “young Western intelligentsia” with parliamentary democracy in “1968” was merely an epiphenomenon of a “long-term cultural crisis” that undermined the authority of “Western” institutions. Deploying the “Western crisis” rhetoric also as a means to create a sense of urgency, Löwenthal’s main aim was to preserve the status quo through stabilizing an identity “nested” in the narrative community of “Western civilization”.


Riccardo Bavaj is Professor of Modern History at the University of St Andrews, and Director of the Institute for Transnational & Spatial History. His research focuses on the intellectual and spatial history of 20th-century Germany. His most recent publications include Germany and ‘the West’: The History of a Modern Concept (ed. with Martina Steber) (2015; pbk 2017); Civilisational Mappings: ‘The West’ at the Turn of the Century (1880-1930) [Zivilisatorische Verortungen] (ed. with Martina Steber) (2018); A Spatial History of Nazism [Der Nationalsozialismus] (2016). See also his article ‘“The West”: A Conceptual Exploration’, European History Online (2011), URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/bavajr-2011-en.

**A EURASIAN CHALLENGE TO WESTERN LIBERAL HEGEMONY: ON ALEKSANDR DUGIN’S RADICAL CONSERVATISM**

Jussi Backman
University of Jyväskylä

In recent years, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has increasingly profiled itself in international politics as an “illiberal” and conservative alternative to the Western model of liberal democracy and social pluralism and as a beacon for certain antiliberal political movements in the West. In the context of international relations, as Anne L. Clunan and Tatiana Romanova point out, Russia has not so much opposed the liberal international order per se but rather highlighted the perceived contradictions inherent in its current form—above all, those between principles of national sovereignty and national or cultural pluralism, on the one hand, and neoliberal globalism, interventionism, and unilateral (American) hegemony, on the other—and sought recognition for Russia’s sovereign status as a regional Eurasian great power with a distinct cultural and political identity.
Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin (b. 1962) is, in many ways, an intellectual personification of these tendencies. Dugin has been one of the most prominent actors on the Russian right-wing political scene since the breakup of the Soviet Union, first and foremost as the key figure of the international Neo-Eurasianist movement. Despite his diverse and sometimes frenzied political activities, Dugin is first and foremost a political theorist whose ideas have gradually gained international prominence and notoriety. In recent years, Dugin’s main theoretical construction has been his “fourth political theory”, distinguished by its attempt to sketch out a vision of a postliberal, genuinely multilateral world order. Dugin situates his thought within the legacy of the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar period, drawing particular inspiration from the geopolitical and legal theories of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). This attempt at formulating a novel type of conservative ideology makes him an actual and potential key influence for the international New Right. Rather than a purely Russian phenomenon, Dugin can thus be characterized as a novel intersection of Western and Russian political thought.

The paper takes a brief look at Dugin’s ambiguous status in the context of contemporary Russian politics and his international ideological significance. It then turns to the twofold background of Dugin’s political thought: the Russian tradition of Eurasianism and the German tradition of “revolutionary” conservatism. In the latter context, Heideggerian philosophy of history and Schmittian geopolitics are particularly important for Dugin. Heidegger’s notion of an end of modernity and “another beginning” of Western thought, together with the pluralist geopolitical models of Schmitt and Samuel Huntington (1927–2008), provide the foundations for Dugin’s vision of an ongoing late modern turn from an increasingly globalized and unipolar world of hegemonic Western liberalism towards a multipolar world of profoundly different “civilizations”—a vision that is most accurately characterized, using the term preferred by Göran Dahl as radical conservatism.

The paper shows that the substance of Dugin’s challenge to the unipolar aspirations of the liberal global order is first and foremost theoretical and intellectual in nature. Even though his project grows out of Russian Eurasianism and is largely harmonious with Russia’s prevalent policies and aspirations for recognized sovereignty as a regional great power with a conservative cultural identity, in the light of Dugin’s considerable international visibility and networks, it is most fruitful to consider his work in the wider context of the international New Right, with its emphasis on cultural and national pluralism and particularism, inspired by the antiliberal ideas of the conservative revolution.

In its substance, Dugin’s fourth political theory cannot be characterized as particularly original; it consists almost entirely in a circulation and eclectic recombination of philosophical and political ideas that have been around for almost a century. Its merit is rather the extraordinarily wide scope of Dugin’s erudition and his ability to bring very different intellectual traditions into concert. The theory remains a draft with much important detail and articulation missing, hopelessly vague on key issues such as the precise nature, dynamic, and internal diversity of a cultural tradition, the different types of interaction between civilizations, and different possible modes of political organization. Its current formulation remains so conspicuously nonpragmatic, even esoteric, that it is manifestly unfit to function as the kind of policy-blueprint that it has sometimes been suspected of being.
However, Dugin has undeniably been able to breathe new life into an old idea, Eurasianism, that clearly has an important influence on Russian geopolitical thinking even among the political and military leadership, and to complement it creatively with Western philosophy and political theory. In a broader and more international framework, Dugin’s perhaps most interesting achievement has been to rediscover and reassert a form of distinctly antimodern conservatism that has most often been overlooked as an available ideological option: the “revolutionary” conservatism of the Weimar era that was irreparably eclipsed by fascism and National Socialism, even though it did not completely perish with them. From a purely theoretical viewpoint, Dugin’s discovery of a coherent ontological, anthropological, and jurisprudential foundation for this ideology in Heidegger and Schmitt is innovative, even unique, in the contemporary context of political theory in its attempt to produce a postliberal model of geopolitics. Dugin’s radical conservative geopolitical vision of cultural pluralism and multipolarity as a challenge to an alleged “Atlantic” liberal hegemony will undoubtedly have a role to play in the theoretical and ideological discourses of twenty-first-century New Right politics.

Jussi Backman is an Academy of Finland research fellow in philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. His work has focused on contemporary continental philosophy (phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics, poststructuralism), continental political theory, ancient philosophy, and conceptual history. His current research project focuses on the conceptual history of creation and creativity. He is the author of numerous articles and the books Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being (SUNY Press, 2015) and Omaisuus ja elämä: Heidegger ja Aristoteles kreikkalaisen filosofian rajalla (Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura, 2005), and has coedited several edited volumes and special issues.

A EUROPEAN TURN IN THE WESTERN NARRATIVE OF IDEAL SOCIETY?

Marja Vuorinen
University of Helsinki

The history of modern statehood and ideal society appears to proceed in alternating cycles of inter/supra-nationalism & universalism vs. nationalism & particularism. The shift between cycles usually involves a conflict, often violent, taking the form of revolution and/or war.

19th-century separatist nationalism developed in a context of imperial rule implemented by the multi-ethnic, multi-national and multi-religious Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Geographically, ethnically, culturally and linguistically defined, egalitarian and pro-democracy movements increasingly challenged the supremacy of empires, fighting for increased self-rule, political inclusivity, social equality and economic & legislative modernisation. The core nations of empires countered the separatisms on their fringes by consolidating nationalism and pan-nationalist movements.

The other prominent aspect of 19th century statehood, with particular relevance to the current European neo-nationalistic strivings and their critique, was the exploitative and violent colonialist imperialism, practiced by European overseas empires and justified not only by technological, military and assumed cultural as well as religious superiority, but also by pseudo-
scientific racist notions. The final dismantling of the colonialist system took place only in the aftermath of World War II.

World War I ended in the defeat of the four European land empires, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Ottoman Turkey. Their dismantling, by the Paris peace process led by the US President Woodrow Wilson, gave birth to a *Europe of small to medium nation states*, emerging from under the imperial rule apparently to fulfil their long-awaited destiny as independent democracies. The Wilsonian nation-state-based solution inspired also many non-European nations, then under colonial rule. High hopes soon proved difficult to realise, with different political fractions struggling for hegemony in parliaments, while extra-parliamentary forces fought in the streets or put up civil wars. Negotiating practices deteriorated, resulting in a sharp increase in semi-totalitarian and totalitarian regimes, of which Italy and Germany were intensely nationalistic, the latter also prominently racist, the Soviet Union pronouncedly internationalist.

World War II in Europe ended in defeat for right-wing totalitarianism, while the left-wing totalitarian, atheist Soviet Union stood among the victors. Even though the saga of independent nation-states continued in Western Europe, the global scene was increasingly operated by a Cold War binary system, with two ideological, global-imperialist regimes, “capitalists” and “communists” contending for dominance, creating an essentially *internationalist system of nations* in a secularising, “modern” world. Nationalism as an ideology was in bad repute since the leftist explanation of Nazism and Fascism as essentially nationalist – instead of imperialist – projects gained ground. Nazi Germany was equated with anti-Semitism and racist politics.

The *post-nationalist* era in Europe began to wane with the reunification of the two Germanys and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Europe entered what might be termed a *re-nationalisation* period. The former Warsaw Pact countries and SU/Russian fringe states renewed their status as independent nation states. In the 2010s, an increasing number of them are ruled by right-wing governments with conservative Christian values and anti-immigrationist attitudes.

In EU Europe – perceivable, by some, as another *supranational empire* – and beyond, mass immigration is creating social friction, with sharpening antagonisms addressed, by some, in terms of neo-nationalism, providing inspiration to both populist parties and radical extra-parliamentary groups. Terrorism related to particularistic religious-nationalistic interests and identities has become a standing issue. The counterpart of European neo-nationalists, the ISIS, is definable as theocratic pan-Islamic nationalism. The next step in the re-nationalisation process encompasses not only the reopening of Catalonian and Scottish *dormant separatisms* and the (re)establishment of the New IRA, but also *new waves of nationalism outside Europe*, e.g. the anti-Islam Hindu Nationalism and ethnically motivated Black Nationalisms in Britain and the US.

After the end of WWII, Western ideal society was increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-religious. The multiculturalist project was led by the victorious Western Allies. US was already a country of immigrants, some voluntary arrivals, others imported by force. Britain and France, dismantling their colonies, received a flow of immigrating former subjects as a corollary; later

Ever since, a universalistic, globalist-multiculturalist rhetoric of progress has dominated the idealist Western narrative, while particularistic national interests have survived on the level of Realpolitik. In the media as well as the academe, nationalism as an ideology has been treated mainly as a source of evils, from the two World Wars to right-wing extremism to anti-EU protests.

A benevolent reading of 19th-century nationalistic endeavour provides perspective also for the current particularistic politics on the global scene – from anti-immigrationist nativism and ethnonationalism, to Catalanian and Scottish neo-separatism, to Hindu nationalism, to (though in a civic instead of ethnic national context) the Trumpian reaction of the US heartlands. The Arab Spring was a paragon of 19th-century-style nationalist uprising against stagnated elites, for democracy, equality and modernisation. The ISIS, in turn, can be seen as a palingenetic attempt at restoring an ancient national-theocratic powerbase.

The current neo-nationalistic tendencies don’t seem to be going away anytime soon. In my presentation, I will analyse them in the light of the long history of European nationalisms. Its variety of contexts, processes and eventual outcomes offers multiple keys to unlock the current situation. Juxtaposing recent developments with similar processes in the past allows us to see what is genuinely new, what is recurring, whether the circumstances are also recurring, and what kind of best and worst case scenarios are to expect.

Some obvious worst-case scenarios related to the current conflict have already actualised. In a potential best-case scenario, the aggressive ideology formation, as practiced by any and all neo-nationalist individuals and groupings, may also function as a political safety valve, keeping most individuals from resorting to violence while venting a suppressed grievances.

The exclusivist and aggressive expressions, typical of the radical neo-nationalist to nativist, to ethno-nationalist scene, can easily be perceived as symptoms of a new type of social friction, with a strong potential of developing into a societal conflict that ends in violence. On the other hand, they may also eventually calm down, e.g. with the emergence and gradual establishment of the neo-conservative, neo-nationalist parliamentary parties within the European political scene.

In the light of the recent developments, we may be approaching a new era of particularism, defined by a growing wish, worldwide, to “come home” from global universalism and godless, atomistic individualism – to belong, again, to places, groups, families, nations, traditions and religions – if perhaps, at least temporarily, at the cost of unity and social tranquillity. The Wilsonian post-WWI model for a Europe of nations may appear even as a potential solution to the Huntingtonian clash of civilisations, worth experimenting even though possibly not realisable on a global scale, entailing a “European turn” in the visioning of an ideal community of nations.
A NEW INTEGRATIVE GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE AMERICAN HEGEMON: MULTILEVEL LEADERSHIP

Tanguy Struye de Swielande
Université catholique de Louvain

As challenges to the values and norms of the international order keep emerging, this paper analyses the tools that the United States has at its disposal to avoid further marginalizing challenging voices of the international order. Building upon the English school (in particular pluralism and solidarism) and leadership theory the paper argues in favor of an American grand strategy based on an integrative multilevel type of leadership.

If the United States does want to keep a relative advantage over its rivals, the rules have to be rewritten and the global system reshaped. In this sense the diagnosis of the Trump administration is partially correct, but the instruments president Trump uses are faulty.

In managerial terms, President Trump focuses exclusively on transactional leadership, defined as relying on the duo rewards-punishments, thus close to the coercive dimension of power. Such leadership often means that goals are set by the leader without necessarily including the followers/allies. It implies an effective control over means of threat or reward by the dominant power. One should not overlook the necessity of transactional leadership, but it is not sufficient - certainly not today, when the United States is in relative decline. Power distance, developed by Hofstede, illustrates this phenomenon: the greater the asymmetry of power between leader and followers, the more the leader will be able to impose itself via its capacities, hence the more transactional its leadership. On the contrary, if the gap keeps shrinking – and provided that the leader wishes to stay at the top of the pyramid – the dominant power must increasingly consider its followers’ needs and interests and ought to share parts of the leadership’s responsibilities with them.

Leadership is therefore about adapting to the context of a given situation - there is no “size fits all”. The United States needs to avoid becoming what John Gaddis labeled a “system destroyer”, instead of a “system builder”. The set up of an international order requires the legitimation of American power by other states. More specifically, the latter should recognize the authority of the former.

With the most material and immaterial capacities (“power to”), the US remains the “great power” with the most means to dominate coercively (“power over”). Yet I contend that this approach is too limited to understand the complexity of power and to guarantee the US primacy in world affairs. Indeed when “power distance” diminishes, resorting only to “power over” is very short-sighted. The more Washington sticks to a position of “going alone”, the more the resistance from allies and foes will increase and accelerate a spill-over effect of allies and partners abandoning the US. As Foucault detailed in his work: where there is power, there is resistance. If the United States does not adjust its policy to this reality, resistance will become sharper and transform into rebellion because of the shift of power relations: the more the powerless become empowered, the more the powerful weakens.

Consequently, if the United States wants to stay at the top it will need support and cooperation, not only from its allies and partners but also from rising status quo powers such
as Brazil, Indonesia and India, and from deviant great powers such as China and Russia. As President Theodore Roosevelt remarked, “Nine-tenths of wisdom is being wise in time”.

Accordingly, although “power to” and “power over” are indispensable characteristics of power, they are not sufficient. An additional and necessary characteristic is “power with”. This concept was developed by Follett and is defined as a “jointly developed power, a co-active, not a coercive power”. Follett was no naive; on the contrary she was very pragmatic and knew that “power with” would never replace “power over”, only reduce it. But for Follett, to lessen “power over” was about:

1. integration - finding a “solution by which the desires of both sides were satisfied, by integrating the desires of the two sides”. She was defending the idea of circular behaviour as base for integration characterized by “interactive influence” (Ibidem: 82 and 83) - A influencing B and B influencing A;
2. submission to the law of the situation;
3. function (each has his function, corresponding to his capacities and has the authority and the responsibility which go with that function).

To achieve these objectives as the final paper will elaborate, American leadership will have to be characterized by co-ordinating leadership of varying types and varying degrees. Only a US grand strategy characterized by maintaining a world order structured around the United States which gives more autonomy and responsibilities to others can be successful. The most effective leaders will have the least leading to do. As Arendt explains, “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with (potestas in populo, with-out a people or group there is no power), disappears, "his power" also vanishes. In current usage, when we speak of a "powerful man" or a "powerful personality," we already use the word "power" metaphorically; what we refer to without metaphor is "strength."

If the United States wants to guarantee its leadership, it will have to empower others. If this does not work, “power over” will again take the upper hand, multiplying the risks. Here it is interesting to mention Arendt’s observation: “physical power is not the ultimate form of power. Quite the contrary, its use represents the failure of social power. Once the Sovereign has to draw their sword it is because the Leviathan has failed to create social power. In a well-functioning Leviathan, this is a relatively infrequent occurrence compared with routine compliance. However, as observed by Arendt, a state that continually uses coercion against [other states] is actually relatively weak”.

**Tanguy Struye de Swielande** is Professor of International Relations at Université catholique de Louvain and Director of Centre d’études des crises et conflits internationaux (CECRI)
Anti-establishment resentment in Germany: From support of the Hells Angels MC to the love of the Russian Night Wolves MC

Tereza Kuldova
University of Oslo

Outlaw motorcycle clubs, such as the iconic Hells Angels, have been a powerful figment of popular culture since the 1950s. Over the decades, they have morphed into strong transnational organizations engaged in their own self-commodification, and have been labelled as organized crime groups posing considerable security threats by law enforcement. This paper focuses on how these organizations engage the superimpositions of fact and fiction in order to mobilize new supporters, turn themselves into pseudo-political populist actors and fuel anti-establishment resentment, thus taking an increasingly prominent position in the current cultural wars. It attempts to answer the question of why more and more people in Europe align themselves ideologically with outlaw bikers, support them, and share their anti-establishment resentments – against the “weak” state, “official” media, or politicians. But most importantly – against the “weak West.” The paper will look at two cases in particular, and the ways in which they are connected: (1) the anti-establishment mobilization by the Hells Angels MC and their supporters in Germany, and (2) the simultaneous rise of popularity of the Russian Night Wolves MC in Germany, and of Vladimir Putin. There is a growing segment of the Western population that not only supports these countercultural bikers and “Putin’s nationalist bikers”, but also looks up to them as their heroes and potential saviors capable of restoring not only law and order, but also morality and values in the ‘decadent, consumerist, and spiritually confused’ West. The countercultural and anti-Western sentiments mirror each other, and often merge – some Hells Angels in Europe, members of the most notorious American outlaw motorcycle club, even look up to Russia as the new promised land. So, what happens when even the most American motorcycle club of them all ceases to believe in America’s hegemony and in the idea of the West? Let me, in this extended abstract, focus on the latter question as a way to partially illuminate the first, while taking a rather unusual path and focusing on what the “wolf” as a symbol of the Russian Night Wolves MC can reveal about the love for this Russian club among those who resent the German government.

Wolves are a classic example of charismatic megafauna. Wolves command respect, and evoke terror, and yet they attract us. We fear them and admire them at the same time. The plethora of folk tales and the obsession with werewolves in popular culture only testify to the allure of the wolf. With Edmund Burke we could say that wolves are sublime creatures. In his Philosophical Inquiry into The Origins of Our Ideas of The Sublime and Beautiful, Burke identified terror as the “common stock of everything that is sublime”, and argued that there is “nothing sublime, which is not some modification of power”. It is this power of the sublime that attracts us. But Burke also argued that for us to enjoy the sublime, we must perceive it at a safe distance, else it is pure terror, which hardly lends itself to enjoyment. This is the difference between enjoying the thrill of a biker exploitation film such as Werewolves on Wheels from the safety of our sofa and actually experiencing the terrors depicted in this horror-cum-outlaw biker movie.

The wolf, an embodiment of this sublime power, has been a symbol popular with bikers and especially outlaw motorcycle clubs worldwide. The wolf is a common club symbol used on the patches of outlaw motorcycle clubs, the so called “one percenters” often implicated in
organized crime, as well as ordinary biker clubs. From the most notorious, the Russian *Night Wolves MC*, via the Australian *Lone Wolf MC* to the Turkish *Gray Wolves MC*, a support outlaw motorcycle club of the notorious *Hells Angels MC*. The wolf appeals to the bikers as a symbol because of the sublime power that it represents, a form of intimidating and yet seductive power they themselves attempt to embody. But it also appeals to them for other reasons. Outlaw bikers see themselves as outsiders to the mainstream society, as a counterculture. As such, they perceive themselves the same way they see the wolf: *as a charismatic but endangered species*. They see themselves as the last men standing, as the last rebels, the last resistance to the current regime, the last warriors. Or as Dave Nichols put it in his outlaw biker memoir, fittingly titled *The One Percenter Code: How to Be an Outlaw in a World Gone Soft*, “In every age, culture and society there is a need for the rebel... But in a nation of bleating sheep, *we must call forth the wolves once more*. It is time for the wild ones to pave the way yet again...” (emphasis mine).

The wolf thus evokes not only a form of sublime power but also a powerful vision of masculinity. Outlaw bikers often see themselves as the only real men left in this world, and thus also as endangered species. They view men today as emasculated by postmodernism, individualism and feminism, and in response profess themselves as a path to powerful, *sovereign manhood*. The wolf with his pack stands in a direct opposition to the self-made individualist, and thus serves as a powerful metaphor for this oppositional understanding of manhood. Outlaw biker clubs are like wolf packs, where the group of brothers derives its strength from the individual, and the individual from the group. This is another reason why the wolf is such a powerful symbol for many bikers. In his popular self-help book for men, *Sovereignty: The Battle for the Hearts and Minds of Men*, Michler quotes from Rudyard Kipling’s *The Law of the Jungle*: “For the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the Pack,” and continues,

“We want to join the battle for life with our brothers in arms. Unfortunately, we bought into the idea that reaching out for guidance, direction, and brotherhood isn’t manly at all. We started to believe the notion of the ‘self-made’ man was the highest achievement any man could obtain.”

For Michler and for many bikers, sovereign manhood can be achieved only through understanding of the power of the pack. Michael Kemmis argued that wolves “move us because of our instinctive response to the sovereignty we sense in them”. Similarly, we could argue that what attracts people to outlaw motorcycle clubs is the sovereignty they embody, and that relies on their sublime power – making them threatening, and yet alluring. Riding a Harley Davidson alone may provide a sense of empowerment, command respect and possess a degree of intimidation power, but riding in a pack, with a patch on your back, and side by side with your brothers, is a whole different story. It is a collective display of sovereignty, manhood and virility.

There is possibly no biker club that embodies the symbolism of the wolf better than the *Night Wolves MC*. Alexander Benish, the second in command of the *Night Wolves MC* once stated that “years ago when it was founded, the club was a kind of symbol of virility, of what it means to be a man.” But even more than traditional forms of masculinity, the club embodies the notion of sovereignty, and national sovereignty in particular. This combination of intimidating
looks, militarism, and a dose of patriotism and pride has earned the club not only many enemies in the West, but also many admirers.

While the annual Second World War victory ride of the Night Wolves MC to the Berlin Soviet War Memorial triggers protests and mobilizes opposition each year, there is also a growing segment of the western population that not only supports these “Putin’s nationalist bikers”, but also looks up to them as their heroes and potential savors capable of restoring not only law and order, but also morality and values in the ‘decadent, consumerist, and spiritually confused’ West. The Night Wolves MC are not an ordinary outlaw motorcycle club, like the Hells Angels that stand in the opposition to the government. To the contrary, the Night Wolves are on good terms with Kremlin, own corporations, security and private military companies, as well as NGOs, and have been instrumental in the annexation of Crimea; through these legitimate fronts the club receives grants from the government. It organizes anti-NATO rallies as often as motorcycle pilgrimages celebrating the Russian Orthodox Church, and it has over 7000 members, including Ramzan Kadyrov, the Head of the Chechen Republic.

The fascination with the Night Wolves MC can be viewed through the symbol of the Wolf and that which it represents in the minds of the supporters – brotherhood, virility, power, traditionalism, sovereignty. This fascination goes hand in hand with the admiration of Putin and his style of rule. However, we must bear in mind that the Wolf and the Night Wolves represent will appeal to people only under specific socio-economic conditions – when they become disillusioned and resentful towards their own governments for neglecting and failing them. Any kind of propaganda requires a material basis on which it can flourish. The support for the Night Wolves and Putin across Europe thrives on a desire for both individual and state sovereignty among people who struggle with feelings of disillusionment, powerlessness, meaninglessness, and lack of hope, often as a result of decades of socio-economic deprivation as a result of neoliberalism. At the core of this fascination is an aesthetics and politics of sovereignty, where a phantasmatic ideal of sovereignty is projected onto the idealized “muscular” Russian Other, sovereignty being precisely the one quality they imagine as increasingly lacking in the “effeminate and submissive” West and its “weakening states.” The Night Wolves merely tap into this resentment and anti-establishment sentiments. It is under these conditions that the figure of the Wolf becomes desirable. Those who cheer the Night Wolves and admire Putin perceive these Russian heroes as the very embodiment of sovereignty, as people who still have honour and ideals, and people who do not shy away from enforcing a state of exception in their name.

The western supporters of the Night Wolves search for sovereignty in the Russian heroes and at the same time blame the European nation states for having sacrificed national sovereignty on the altar of the EU, global institutions, and transnational capital, and in the name of the neoliberal “free market”. In turn, their Russian heroes, utilized by the Kremlin propaganda machine, skillfully perform a semblance of a sovereign way of life and sovereign politics for the receptive audiences abroad – where corrupt is still preferable to ‘enslaved’ and submissive. What the Night Wolves offer to their admirers is the idea of them and anyone who joins them and supports them being the Wolf – the opposite of the ‘effeminate’ and ‘duped’ sheep that simply follow. It is no coincidence that the anti-establishment rhetoric of outlaw motorcycle clubs more often than not plays with conspiracy theories that label obedient citizens as ‘sheeple’ and those enlightened as wolves.

**CHALLENGING THE WESTERN HEGEMONY: CHANGING THE PARADIGM OF DIPLOMACY IN THE GULF STATES**

William Guéraiche  
University of Wollongong Dubai (UOWD)

I: The US in the Middle East, from ‘Imperialism’ to ‘influence’?

The role of the US in the Middle East since the Cold War has stimulated an abundant literature. It is perceived as positive or negative depending on the conviction of the authors, supporting one of the two super-powers. Some scholars highlighted the continuity of the US’s post-Cold War influence with the colonization period. The Americans took over from the European colonizers, the argument goes, imposing their interests, although after the two World Wars the Arabs were capable of running their own affairs. Most of the Western and American authors, on the other hand, justified American presence in the Middle East by the defence of the Free World.

The US agenda is clear. The security of Israel has been the cornerstone of US policy in the region, stimulating initiative towards an Arab-Israeli peace. In parallel, different US administrations promoted, most often genuinely, economic growth and democratic reforms in the region. The not-so-hidden agenda of this policy was to maintain access to energy supplies, namely oil. Prior to 2003, as William B. Quandt notes, the American interests in the region were surprisingly well protected compared to its interests in Southeast Asia for instance. On the surface, the US emerged as the unchallenged power in the Middle East after the fall of the USSR. It is widely assumed that the Americans used their proactive diplomacy, military and economic power to ensure security and stability in the region.

However, the US presence – perceived as overbearing – has created widespread resentment in the Middle East and beyond in the Islamic World. To maintain their interests, the US is thought to have largely ignored issues of democracy, governance and human rights in some so-called allied countries. The seeds of anti-Americanism have grown across in the region more recently with Radical Islam. In 2008, Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh pointed out that the Bush administration’s foreign policy left the Middle East ‘in a precarious position’. Ten years later, under Trump’s administration, the situation could be characterized as anarchic.

That said, who generates these discourses on the ‘Americans’? For decades, scholars have distinguished the ruling elite of the Arab States from ‘the Street’, an elusive *vox populi* that epitomized Arab public opinion. Arab leaders might be easily analysable, but the same cannot be said of the vast majority of the Arab population – 400 million people – because there is little reliable poll data. Conclusions should be examined with care. In addition to this dichotomy between the “rulers” and the “people” of the Arab world, Americans perceptions too, may be
contrasted: for instance, the same regime or person may express criticism against the US foreign policy but in the meantime, speak highly of the United States as a country.

II: Is Arab Diplomacy a challenge to the West?

The foreign policy and diplomacy of the Arab states are still not well-known and analysed through the prism of Western concept. Since WWII, the creation of area studies, led to the conviction that the Global South must follow the trajectory of the West and all countries were subject to a similar pattern of analysis. For instance, the ministries of the Foreign Affairs are supposed to be central in the definition of the national foreign policies. States although fictional like in Lebanon were supposed to act ‘rationally’ like the Western states do. When they did not, Orientalist explanations came into play. Small states with small populations like Kuwait have therefore ‘played subordinate roles in regional and international politics’. With no past, these ‘tribes with flags’ have no future either and are simply engaged in “carpe diem diplomacy’.

Until recently, very few researchers in International Relations – most of the them American or European – worked on the assumption that there were non-Western logics in Arab policies. Abdul-Monem al-Mashat is one them. The Egyptian scholar conceptualised a theory of concentric circles around the United Arab Emirates to explain its foreign policy and diplomacy. Like its neighbours, the country seems to have bestowed diplomatic preferences on countries based on their proximity, geographically and culturally, to an ideological core. The seven emirates are the centre around which all states gravitate. The Gulf neighbours, part of the same ‘Arab nation’ make up the first circle around the federation. The remaining Arab States, a visual and contextual corollary, comprise the second circle and the Muslim ones, in the same vein, make up the third circle. Beyond these three primary circles, the other states of the world indistinctively form the fourth circle – including the West. This pattern, however, deserves refining because fault lines exist in the different emirates as well as in the different circles: for instance, Dubai does not share with Abu Dhabi its perception of Iran; an Arab state such as Morocco does not have the same credit as Jordan; while dominant powers like the US, some European states or China may enjoy more privileges compared with Brazil or the Philippines. This representation of the world has oriented foreign policies, although economics and security have inevitably guided relations with neighbours as well as the great economic and military powers of the world.

III: The New Game of Nation Branding

If security remains one of the main concerns of Gulf States, an emphasis has been put on their image abroad. Self-perception is an equally dictating factor in Saudi Arabia, the UAE or Qatars’ foreign policy. Their decisions makers see themselves as heirs of a long tradition, proud to defend their legacy against the overwhelming changes of globalisation. Ironically, the ‘outsiders’ perceive these Gulf States as the spearhead of modernity in the Arab world. The genesis of this latter representation dates back to the emergence of Dubai as an economic hub in the Middle East. Abu Dhabi, other monarchies like Qatar, and more recently Saudi Arabia have followed in the footsteps of the merchant city. Even if the initial intention of the branding aimed at attracting investors and tourists, regional diplomacy incorporated the benefits as well as the methodology. Interestingly, the Emirati diplomacy is today a blend of traditional values or practices and state-of-the-art commercial strategies primarily used in Dubai.
Nation branding has become a powerful driver in the realm of international politics – a tool of soft power. Branding, a marketing term, has been recently co-opted in the discourse of politics and international relations. Indeed, communication teams have associated nation with the concept in order to coin ‘nation branding’. Simon Anholt, strategist and policy adviser has advocated nation and place branding: cities, provinces, or countries can be promoted like any brand with a promotional campaign aimed at spreading a desired image abroad. As a result, all nations compete. Their foreign policy and diplomacy impact their image. In this game, international media equalize major powers and small states. The disastrous image of the US is therefore an advantage for its competitors, including the Gulf States.

William Guéraiche (PhD) is an Associate Professor at the University of Wollongong in Dubai (UOWD) and currently teaches Security at postgraduate level. His research extended over many areas in the social sciences, including International Relations, Geopolitics, Conflicts, Politics, and Diplomacy in the Middle East and Asia. He is currently working on a volume on security issues (traditional and non-traditional) in the UAE.

**China’s Rise and Regions-of-Relations: Arctic Case Study**

Liisa Kauppila  
University of Turku, Finland

China is everywhere. From Africa to the Arctic, Chinese actors are becoming engaged in networks of governance, business and science relationships, and transforming the landscape of globalisation in a fundamental way. Yet, despite the ample international attention given to China’s latest global megaproject Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路), it is clear that the mechanisms through which China’s political and economic influence spreads across the world are not understood in a sufficient manner. The argument put forward in the first part of this paper is that the problem lies, to a large extent, in the dominant analytical categories – theoretical tools that have been constructed while seeking to understand the dynamics of a Western-led international society. In particular, the mainstream IR understanding(s) of the concept of ‘region’ – a device making sense of the spatial organization of the world – is preventing us from seeing the complex patterns of relations through which China’s global influence spreads in an international society defined by the end of Western hegemonies.

The first part of the paper briefly discusses three alternative regional worlds – one of territorially anchored clusters suggested by mainstream IR theories, another of functional regions held together by flows, and a third of regions-of-relations of human networks – to both deconstruct the mental models that give us blinds and reconstruct a parallel vision that gives a more unconstrained view of the spatial implications of China’s rise. The conclusion of the first part is that 1) the idea of regions-of-relations offers us an unconventional perspective to mapping and studying China’s emerging spheres of influence, and the country’s rise to the status of a global power in general, but 2) we cannot completely ignore territorial thinking within the relational paradigm either; instead, the relationship between the relational and territorial readings of regions must be made explicit and theorised.

The second part of the paper suggests an empirical case – Arctic region-of-relations – that is well suited to operationalising the relational paradigm, and the idea of regions-of-relations, in particular. A constellation that emerges as a result of increasing economic activities and
political interest in the northernmost corner of the world, the Arctic region-of-relations is gradually becoming an important sphere of influence to manage for China – most importantly because participation in Arctic affairs offers the country a chance to diversify its energy portfolio and transportation routes, tackle climate change related risks and gain new knowledge and technological skills from some of the most challenging engineering projects of human history. By utilising the within-case method of practice tracing, this section 1) identifies examples of particular practices, ways of doing things, through which Chinese actors build and manage relations in the Arctic context and hence shape processes of region formation in the High North; and (based on this), 2) abstracts analytical mechanisms that are, to some extent, useful in understanding processes of (relational) region formation across the world.

A core concept of the second part of the paper is guanxi bonding, a notion coined to refer to the complex process of creating, managing and manipulating relations to meet one’s own needs. As Kavalski has pointed out, guanxi is both something very Chinese – the “lifeblood of all things Chinese – business, politics, and society” – and yet a very universal phenomenon that can be distinguished in human encounters globally. Indeed, by actively imposing a sense of reciprocity through friendly behaviour or favours, political and economic actors across the world frequently participate in the “games of guanxi”. Although guanxi bonding is always an important aspect of global life and politics, the relationalist reading gives it the highest emphasis: if power is relations, all that really matters is how well one manages to bond, build trust and send a (more or less disguised) signal of reciprocity. As for the empirical content of this part, examples of Chinese practices of guanxi bonding abstracted from the Arctic case include publishing official policy documents on regional affairs, banquet and gala giving, panda diplomacy and presidential visits. These typical ways of strengthening China’s ties with useful partners contribute to the creation and maintaining of “circles of relations” that make up the complex constellations of regions-of-relations, including the one emerging in the context of the Arctic change.

In conclusion, this paper suggests that China’s rise and the concurrent end of Western hegemomies brings into the limelight global processes that cannot be fully explained through the existing analytical categories constructed to explain the dynamics of Western-led international society. The idea of regions-of-relations challenges our Westphalian spatial imagination embedded in dominant IR theories, and offers an alternative take that emphasises the crucial role of practices of guanxi bonding in the formation of regions, units that consist of overlapping relational circles. As a final note, it is important to emphasise that such a shift may allow us to make sense of the spatial organisation of both China-led international society in the future and that of the Western-led international society during different historical periods of Western hegemomies.

Liisa Kauppila is a PhD Candidate from the University of Turku, Finland. Drawing from her academic background in Futures Studies, East Asian Studies and Politics and History, Liisa studies rising China’s role in global processes of regionalisation. Over the years, she has worked in various China and/or futures research related projects both in China and Finland.
CONTINUING COLONIAL RELICS?
COLONIAL HEGEMONIC LEGISLATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF INDIGENOUS SELF-RULE IN INDIA

Abhilash Thadathil
Centre for Developing Studies
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India

The western neoliberal idea and its tenets argue for governance must be carried out within the constraints of the doctrines of limited government and self-regulating markets. Absolute commitment to the free market and the state-sponsored privatization started to take roots in India in the late 1980s and spread from the 1990s on, when the country officially liberalized its economy. During this period the state has passed two Acts that aim to provide rights for its indigenous populations called Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Area (PESA), Act and the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. However, it did not made inroads in indigenous heartlands where state is almost non-existent. Arrival of Multi-national corporations in the advent of new economic policies after 1990s also played a major role in debilitating the true spirit of these Acts. The idea of competitive federalism endorsed by the central government forced the state governments to provide best business environment for corporations, which was non-existent before 1990s. Corporations of this sort heightened in these more fluid and open system of accumulation not only exacerbated the uneven geographical development but also led to dispossession of large areas of indigenous land.

As Prabhat Patnaik says, “capitalism cannot do without whole range of goods produced by peasants located in the tropical and sub-tropical areas that have fixed landmass—goods that either cannot be produced in temperate lands, or cannot over be produced in adequate volumes.”. The western neo-liberal idea has promised that the economic liberalisation is also good for the poor and eventually its benefits will trickle down even those who are right at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. However, the much touted growth prospects did not enable everyone to take part in markets and economy and increased inequality. The indigenous peoples were the worst affected in this regard. Therefore, this paper would analyse the trajectories of the prevalence of ‘West’s’ hegemonic rules and regulations in the post-independent India and how the such laws and acts are becoming a stumbling block to the quest for the welfare and self-rule of the most vulnerable communities.

Therefore, this paper evaluates the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and its draft amendment in 2019, which proposed to give arbitrary powers to forest department, the agency that look after the forest and environment in the country, in order to understand how the colonial hegemony over forest and natural resources is being transferred to the post-colonial Indian state and how such changes are depriving the forest dwelling, the most vulnerable, communities in India. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part evaluates the colonial forest laws and its impact on the forest dwellers in India. The second part will briefly evaluate the amendments of colonial legislations and post-colonial state sponsored amendments. How it will affect the existing legal safeguards to protect the welfare of the welfare of the people based on my field observations in two reserve forests in south India. Finally, in conclusion, I have found that the neo-liberal
state seems to be unable or sometimes not intend to alter the colonial hegemonic forest legislations that are hampering the livelihood of the 10.4 million indigenous peoples who are continues to be forest-dependant. Instead of thoroughly redesign the laws in accordance with the globally accepted practices such as conservation through community involvement, the amendment of colonial forests legislations ignores the significance of economic and cultural dependence of people on the ecosystems and species to be conserved. It again brought us back to the question of indigenous marginality.

There are several factors that hampering the rights of the indigenous communities. I think we need to go beyond the broad understanding of neo-liberalism, which is incompatible with the indigenous world view and it is generally accepted the fact that land and landscapes are cultural assets for indigenous communities, not just a commercial assets. Therefore, it is essential to go beyond this macro level understanding in order to understand shifting nature of the state in developing world, which are in need of infrastructure and industry for the welfare of its population. However, as far as forest resources are concerned, instead of following a participatory conservation method the neo-liberal state uses its coercive forces, like its colonial predecessors, to enforce its hierarchical power structure and asymmetrical interdependence between the institutions and community as Ranajit Guha says, it creates, “supremacy without hegemony” by the institutions over the Guha elaborates his theory that “the metropolitan state was hegemonic in its character, and its claim to dominance was based on a power relations in which persuasion outweighed coercion.” Conversely, the colonial state was non-hegemonic, but in its structure of dominance, coercion was paramount. It was not possible for that non-hegemonic state to assimilate the civil society of the colonised itself. Thus the colonial state, as Guha defines, in this closely argued work, was a paradox—dominance without hegemony. However, though there are few issues, in the West, the same neo-liberal state (first world) has more or less addressed the concern of indigenous communities. Therefore, we need to problematise the transforming structural changes of the states in developing worlds in line with Guha’s argument. The continuing empowerment of the coercive mechanisms like the forest bureaucracy seems to be preventing states from effectively dispensing the rights of the most vulnerable populations. Such actions are ultimately transforming the colonial hegemony to state-hegemony in conformity with the needs of the finance capital.

Abhilash Thadathil (PhD) is an Assistant professor at the Centre for development studies Thiruvananthapruam, Kerala. I have 7 years’ Teaching experience. My qualification is a PhD in Political Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Area of research: Indigenous Marginality and Political economy in India. I have been doing research on land alienation, self-rule and marginality of indigenous population in south and western India since last 10 years.
Cosmopolitanism: A Philosophical Concept between Utopia and European Hegemony

Ledio Albani
Humboldt University Berlin

Cosmopolitanism: A philosophical concept between Utopia and European Hegemony Since Roman antiquity, cosmopolitanism as an ethical utopia has been closely linked to an idea of cosmopolitanism as a cloak for imperial world designs, as a cloak also for the expansion efforts of European ideas and values. The Roman Empire, the Christian Middle Ages, the era of colonialism or the triumphal march of the so-called Western democracies from the middle of the 20th century - in all these historical stages there is the same expansive basic moment of European history and the way of thinking. It is reflected precisely in the fact that it is not only a matter of shaping a world model, but also of spreading this idea throughout the entire globe. However, Kant's continuum of human rights, civic sovereignty and peace, which is linked to the ideas of the Enlightenment, has ensured the stability of democratic states precisely through the self-legislation of the citizens. It is especially this bond and the foundation of a federalist structure that guarantees the balance between individual nation states and can ultimately be regarded as the guarantor of the "eternal peace" described by Kant.

On the other hand, it is the cosmopolitically founded globalization, which is often used as a slogan, that seems to undermine these mechanisms. On a political level, it is precisely the globalization of democratic mechanisms that leads to democracy becoming the construct of an increasingly less transparent world order and thus abandoning its own principles. In particular, the establishment of an apparent lack of alternatives to globalized Western socio-political forms is transforming these originally federalist features of democracy into an imperialist indoctrination of systems and states with a different approach. This circumstance, which has long been the subject of numerous studies from a historical and social perspective and whose significance has been analysed, must now be viewed from a genuinely philosophical perspective with regard to the role of various cosmopolitan drafts throughout the history of ideas. It must be established that the idea of cosmopolitanism still holds the heritage of European intellectual history. On the one hand, cosmopolitanism can be regarded as a draft of an ethical utopia, but on the other hand, the opposite is true and the initial utopias, when looking at modern history, soon change into catastrophic and dystopian scenarios.

These dependencies, the genealogical origins of cosmopolitanism and its significance for the cosmopolitan drafts of contemporary philosophy, will be examined in this lecture. The question of the deeper origin of the cosmopolitan idea in its tension between a utopia and a dystopia will be examined. Is cosmopolitanism in the sense of Erasmus of Rotterdam and Immanuel Kant necessary to generate an eternal peace between the states, or would this world-state, spanning the entire circle, represent the beginning of an unmanageable dystopia? Does a cultural cosmopolitanism generate a deeper understanding of the other and the foreign, or is it the beginning of the end of a multipolar world? Looking at all these points, this lecture is intended to promote a deeper understanding of a genealogy of cosmopolitanism and of the origins of contemporary cosmopolitan designs.

Ledio Albani is a PhD student in Philosophy at the Humboldt University Berlin.
CROUCHING (PAPER) TIGER, HIDDEN (PAPER) DRAGON, AND THE CLASH OF THE CONSPIRATORIAL TURN? A POST-FOUNDATIONAL INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN POLITICAL CONSPIRACY THEORY DISCOURSES IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS SINCE THE EVENTS OF TIANANMEN

Niki Sopanen
University of Helsinki

This research paper provides an overview of my doctoral dissertation in progress that deals with foreign political conspiracy theory discourses in Sino-U.S. relations from the events of Tiananmen to the end of the first presidential term of the U.S. President Donald Trump. It suggests a hypothesis that there has been a “conspiratorial turn” in Chinese and American foreign policy-related discourses in the current era of the said two great power leaders, who are known for promoting their mutually competitive international strategies abroad and respective populist-nationalist agendas at home.

In the light of recent years, previously mentioned strategies and agendas can surely be labelled as hegemonic or counter-hegemonic moves and reactions against one another. Under President Trump’s command, the US has waged a trade war with China, in addition to which it has strongly criticized Chinese flagship projects The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), and Made in China 2025 strategy. In terms of national defense, The Trump Administration has acknowledged the revival of great power politics by endorsing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIPS) and by framing China as its “challenger” in government documents. Additionally, the US has shown support for Taiwan, while it has vociferously condemned Chinese espionage, hacking activities and China’s upcoming social credit system, along with the suppression of political activists and minorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China, in turn, has defended its ambitious projects by claiming that alarmist/conspiratorial claims levelled by the US are nothing but bluff, fake news and hegemony-preserving rhetorical stunts. To cite President Xi Jinping’s rebuttal: “BRI is not a conspiracy”. From a Chinese perspective, all its goals and actions seem to result in “win-win” to all the other actors, even if its two centenary goals for years 2021 and 2049 have been regarded as claims for regional/global hegemony. Interestingly, however, the Chinese party-state also tends to view and explicate US criticism on itself and the Chinese society as a genre of (western) discourse by “hostile forces” that aims at subverting the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As one can expect, the US side tends to duly renounce such claims. In sum, both sides exhibit a habit of denying allegations of their hegemonic or interventionist tendencies by claiming that accusations are “conspiracy theories”, whereas these two also happen to portray the economic and national defense-related ambitions of the other in a way that can be regarded as “conspiratorial”.

However, one cannot help from wondering: does this assumed conspiratorial turn, along with its assumed ideological and rhetorical implications, differ in any meaningful way from the patterns of thought and speech within post-Cold War Sino-U.S. relations? Furthermore, what kind of a discursive genre is foreign political conspiratorial discourse as such, and can it be analyzed separately from other threat perception/enemy-related discourses in international
relations, e.g., national security defense discourse, national(ist) propaganda and (populist) ethno-civilizational othering/enemy speech? These are the questions that my dissertation - this paper as its manifestation - sets to tackle.

So far, conspiratorial dimensions in Sino-U.S. relations have remained an uncharted theme in the field of political science and international relations. Furthermore, as conspiracy theories in western countries have often been framed as "pathologies of post-truth politics", or as "dislocatory effects of (post)modern alienation, anxieties and disbelief", their historicity, particularity and politicality have scarcely been touched upon through comparative inquiries. Therefore, against the aforementioned intellectual context, my research paper points out that even if the current era of the conspiratorial turn constitutes a clear paradigm change, it also reminds that conspiratorial discourses have always played a role within Sino-U.S. relations, international relations, and politics in general. More specifically, this paper covers the conceptual, contextual and theoretico-methodological framework of the dissertation. In other words, the paper presents a Koselleckian conceptual history framework for analyzing conceptualizations of “conspiracy” and “conspiracy theory” both in Chinese and Anglo-American contexts, in addition to the self-developed typology and Essex school-inspired methodology for recognizing particular and general characteristics in conspiratorial discourses. Additionally, the paper sheds light on the case study proper of the dissertation: the speeches and literary works of US and Chinese presidents along with national defense –related government documents.

Niki Sopanen is a PhD student in the Doctoral Programme in Political, Societal and Regional Change, University of Helsinki.

**Dissenting views about climate change and U.S. global leadership**

Anna Kronlund

University of Jyväskylä

"Climate change is real" (Don Beyer in 2018)

"Fake news includes climate change" (Lamar Smith in 2017)

Above mentioned quotes are the titles of remarks of two them members of Congress, presented during 115th Congress, namely by Representatives Don Beyer (Democrat) and Lamar Smith (Republican). The United States is considered in many ways to lead the “West” in several fronts including science, innovation and technology but also in maintaining international security and economic stability, to mention a few. Under the current administration, the U.S. has selectively sought to take leadership in certain global issues and agreements including climate change.

The question of how to respond to climate change and the science behind it has raised disputes in domestic debates in the U.S. The two main parties both rely on “research and expertise in policy debates” but they have differing views in trusting scholarly outputs and scientists, not to mention the sources of information. There are also different views on what kind of role
science should play in the political decision-making. The “alarmists” i.e. through liberal media or “liberal science” in connection with climate change have been accused of providing “fake news.” In opposition, the consensus of manmade climate change accepted by the scientific and international communities is adopted to argue against ignoring climate science and to make the case for U.S. the leadership.

“Leading by example”

Depiction of global leadership and substantial engagement in international affairs has been used to describe the role of the United States in the world over the past 70 years. The U.S. role has not been, however, unanimously agreed to but choices between “more engagement vs. less engagement”, the balance between “narrowly defined interest and broader values”, and the balance between soft and hard power have marked the most significant debates.

While representing both liberal and structural foundations of the order, the U.S. has often also refused to get more entangled in certain norm-based global governance arrangements. Climate change being only one example of this interest based “selectivity”. During President Obama’s administration, however, a strong emphasis on international climate change cooperation was made. Climate change as a topic was included in the 2015 national security strategy and the president addressed the issue bilaterally for example with leaders of China and Brazil. Climate change has been since removed from the most recent strategy published by the Trump administration in 2017. President Trump in his remarks on the withdrawal of the Paris Accord argued that the agreement threatens U.S. sovereignty, weakens the U.S. economy, and puts U.S. in a disadvantaged position in comparison to other major players. President also criticized Green Climate Fund for unfair burden sharing. Speaking after the president, then the Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency Scott Pruitt emphasized that U.S. is leading with “action” instead of “words”. He also pointed out that the U.S. effort should be in exporting (U.S.) technology and innovation to nations who aims to decrease their carbon footprint “to learn from us”.

In transnational relations, scientist and science play a “direct role”. In regard to climate change, the U.S. has shown leadership in science and been supportive for partnerships, research on development and technology and other types of international efforts. However, at the same time political and public interests concerning climate change has been ”cycled up and down” in the recent decades.

The pendulum switching in environmental policies after the elections is highly visible in the United States. Despite the changes of administration, climate change has stayed on the agenda. Congress passed legislation in 2017 including a clause of climate change. The National Defense Authorization Act stated how “climate change is a direct threat to the national security of the United States.” The most recent World Wide Threat Assessment, published by the U.S. intelligence community, includes a section of human security, specifically naming section of “global environmental and ecological degradation and climate change”. The U.S. Global Change Research Program published its fourth National Climate Assessment in 2018, which also pointed out to the risks of inaction.
Further, the new democratic controlled House of Representatives voted in May 2019 on the “Climate Action Now Act” bill, which would prevent the current administration from withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement. The bill also suggests the administration to find ways for the U.S. to keep its commitments under the agreement. Similarly, in the previous 115th Congress, Resolution 155—“expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should work in cooperation with the international community and continue to exercise global leadership to address the causes and effects of climate change, and for other purposes” was introduced in the Senate.

The new select committee on the climate crisis in the House of Representatives was established in the current 116th Congress. The functions and the authority of the Select Committee “shall be to investigate, study, make findings, and develop recommendations on policies, strategies, and innovations to achieve substantial and permanent reductions in pollution and other activities that contribute to the climate crisis...”. The Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, endorsed establishing the new committee to produce recommendations on climate policy.

“Science – based informed decisions”

How can science conveniently be used to support political decision-making? Discussions on the quality of scientific expertise have been taking place in many years in both UK and Europe. In regard to policy issues, including technology and science, proponents from both sides science and politics, purposefully apply science to advance an agenda motivated by their separate, biased interests.

General agreement in many ways in the U.S. political discussions is that climate change exists. But whether and to what kind of threat it is and how to deal with are examples of questions that provide different answers. The dividing question is what kind of science is available and how it is used in the decision-making process. As all policies, policies for science and technology are aimed to address state’s objectives. This can mean different things. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze tendencies in domestic debates and to examine how science is used in discussions on climate change and the U.S. global role.

The paper deals with the twofold question of how “science” is politicized in the U.S. political discussions on environment and climate change in particular and how it is used in the argumentation concerning United States’ leadership and international commitments. Further, the purpose is to address the interrelation between domestic debates and U.S. leadership on global issues such as climate change. The materials analyze include recent U.S. policy documents (presidential speeches and congressional discussions) and procedures to address the political discussions on science, climate change and U.S. global engagements.

Anna Kronlund works as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Jyväskylä. Her research interests include U.S. politics and political system and more specifically U.S. Congress and foreign policy and climate change as a political question in the United States.
Two centuries after the political revolutions that overthrew the absolutist monarchies of Europe, Michel Foucault argued that in the field of political thought we had not yet cut off the king’s head. Indeed the colonial power has not only survived but also reproduced itself in a more legitimate way in Australia. While the invisible exercise of colonial power based on racism never destroys physical structures it has the potential to both undermine and devastate the marginalised groups devaluing their practices and knowledge system in society. In contemporary Australia, it may prove excessively difficult to reorganise the complexity of omnipresent ongoing colonial power. The scholarship based on the Western philosophy and knowledge also cannot be challenged easily by Indigenous knowledge as it is difficult to prove that the legitimate form of Western scholarship is the continuum of the exercise based on colonial power. Western social science research has contributed to, and drawn on, the Western systems of classification, representation, and evaluation that coded Indigenous people and their societies in ways that explained, where it did not naturalise, injustice. Although Indigenous methodologies are also a mix of existing methodological approaches and Indigenous practices it has been devalued in the academic area. Collecting Indigenous knowledge based on Indigenous methodology has also constantly faced the limit and difficulties for the reason.

As Linda Tuhiwai Smith notes, “the cultural archive did not embody a unitary system of knowledge but should be conceived of as containing multiple traditions of knowledge and ways of knowing; some knowledges are more dominant than others, some are submerged and outdated”. Therefore, archiving Indigenous knowledge is not the simple and juxtaposed collections of authentic knowledge but it is rather the rigorous process of the restoration of fragmented ones to rebuild and recreate the new system of Indigenous knowledge. When the non-Western/Indigenous knowledges get collected in that way to challenge the previous knowledge structure, it eventually can not only crack the concrete legitimacy of dominant knowledge but also enable to amend the flaw and fallacies of the Western knowledge. For instance, Western feminism has provided a radical challenge to knowledge as its challenge to epistemology. Asian medical practices and knowledge have also challenged to restructure the meaning of “medical effect and reliability” which the Western medical practices had mostly dominated to define and determine. In methodological debates, one responsibility for researchers studying Indigenous people is to provide epistemological challenges to the Western knowledge system. Certainly there must be limitations posed for the analysis by the fact that the theories scholars want to use to analyse their researched data are embedded in colonial and colonising power. Therefore, when researchers who would like to analyse their data based on the “decolonising methodology” try to prioritise those theoretical perspectives, like Michel Foucault’s, which are attentive to the complexity of power, “it is significant at this level that researchers have to clarify and justify their intentions”. In *Decolonising Methodologies*, Smith states that “the acts of reclaiming, reformulating and reconstituting Indigenous cultures and languages have required the mounting of an ambitious research programme, one that is very strategic in its purpose and activities and relentless in its pursuit of social justice”. As she suggests, various projects such as cultural survival, self-determination, healing, restoration, and social justice are engaging Indigenous researchers and
Indigenous communities in a diverse array of projects in global. Smith also introduces 25 Indigenous projects in *Decolonising Methodologies* to clarify the aim of Indigenous research in reducing the errors or gap between Western and Indigenous epistemological issues.

Given this, Indigenous scholars and researchers who have been engaging in research within the Indigenous communities in Australia have endeavoured to establish “Indigenous methodology” based on the experimental and redefined scientific approaches. However, the actual procedure of collecting Indigenous knowledges based on the Indigenous methodology in order to apply them to the community/environmental projects has been confronting the issue of the agency in Australia. For example, in the cases of several projects for northern Australian landscape, there has been little discussion or debate as to whether this will occur, how Indigenous knowledge operates at different scales, and how Indigenous people’s agency plays out in the decision making on indigenous landscapes. It appears the more Indigenous knowledge is championed by non-Indigenous people, the more it is co-opted by them and becomes a reified, abstracted universal concept of ecology.

At this point this paper examines whether/how in the new millennium the scholars joining the epistemological challenges within the project of restoration of Indigenous knowledge in Australia can achieve the global legitimacy in order to decolonise the Western social sciences heavily based on the continuum of the white supremacy within the structure of colonialism; whether/how this Indigenous epistemological challenge and the global Indigenous scholarship can crack the cohesion of “Western knowledges, philosophies, and ‘storehouse’ of histories, artifacts, ideas, texts and/or images, which are classified, preserved, arranged and represented back to the West”, constantly maintaining the Indigenous people’s agency for this future project in contemporary Indigenous Australia.

**Hae Seong Jang** is a Postdoctoral researcher in the faculty of social sciences at Helsinki University, Finland working on Social identities of Sámi young generation in Sápmi. She is an author of the book ‘Social Identities of Young Indigenous People in Contemporary Australia: Neo-Colonial North, Yarrabah’ (Springer, New York). She can be contacted at Hae.Jang@helsinki.fi.

**GENDER: THE FIRST FAKE NEWS**

**Martin Palllister**

In this paper I will ask the question of whether we are any closer to the end of patriarchal hegemony in the West both conceptually and substantively. Is the legitimacy of this hegemony facing its first real challenge? Since Simone de Beauvoir’s famous line “One is not born, but rather becomes, woman” there have been numerous arguments from a variety of feminist philosophers deconstructing gender and questioning its reality. They show gender to be a social construction with the very specific aim of upholding the patriarchal system. I argue that these alternative transformative narratives to essentialist binary narratives on gender are reaching the mainstream and that we are beginning to realise that gender is the first *fake news*.

Fake news is not an abstract generalised concept; it has a specific goal and purpose to the benefit of the original actors who invented the fake story. Therefore first I will define the concept of fake news, then I want to show that we must view gender, where gender is defined as a binary notion of what it means to be a man and what it means to be a woman, as a construction by a *fictional colonialization* of the West by white, middle-class heterosexual
males to create and maintain their capitalist power. I propose that by viewing the ontology of gender in the West within this framework then we realise that our status as persons is judged by the lack of any, or all, of the qualities of the colonialists and a subsequent hierarchy is created.

It is clear that by definition the West cannot colonise the West. However, it is an interesting move, as it draws our eye towards exactly who the oppressors are and has the positive effect of making intersectionality visible. To illustrate how the creation of the patriarchal hierarchy in the west has similarities to colonialism I will compare the historical situations of the Witch Hunts in Europe with the colonisation of America, and the way that women and native Indians were depicted. Aníbal Quijano argues that the colonialization of America resulted in a new global patrón de poder or power pattern. I agree, although I argue that this new patrón de poder had already begun to find form in the patriarchal colonisation of the West. In both cases of colonization new systems of hierarchy and binary systems of knowledge were formed and soon went viral. A heterosexual hierarchy of domination and subordination became naturalized.

Once I have established the creation of the patriarchal system, I will then turn to see how feminist philosophers such as Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler and Maria Lugones have presented arguments and new fictions that threaten the reality of gender. I will argue that although each of their concepts seem to be in tension, they are each necessary steps towards seeing gender as fake news. These challenges take us closer to the end of Western patriarchal hegemony than first and second wave feminism, both of which were necessary but not sufficient in achieving substantive equality between persons. I argue that first and second wave feminism did not directly challenge the position of the white, middle-class heterosexual male. That in fact the colonialists may have seen the advances made by first and second wave feminism as acceptable concessions to preserve their position at the top of the hierarchy, by safeguarding stability and production.

By questioning the binary nature of this structure, we begin to see that any essentialism ascribed to women or men is a myth. The incommensurability of the notion of what it is to be a real man makes it an unattainable, unknowable phantasm that is a cause of paranoia in men causing many of their fictional essentialist characteristics. Many men do not want to continue in this paranoiac state. It is the notion that “boys will be boys” that must be challenged, rigid gender roles that do not let men be more than static ideas.

The danger with this theory of colonialism that I am putting forward is that we idealise, or have nostalgia for, a pre-colonial time. However, as it is a fiction, we can resist the temptation to look for a before in vain attempt to discover an authentic feminine or masculine and avoid the “historical inevitability” of the construction and reproduction of oppressive laws. This leaves us to be subversive in the process of atomising our sense of what it is to be a person. It also leaves us open to alternative fictions and possibilities presented by the histories of peoples before colonialism.

Women’s rights are under constant threat. Substantive gains in some areas are coupled with losses in others. However, conceptually we are closer to the end of Western patriarchal hegemony and this could bring about lasting change. It is clear that the challenge is very real, if only because of the global backlash it is causing from right-wing neo-liberals. The theories of gender and the diversity of people who can be brought together through social media, such as
The acceptance of the alterity of persons combined with the opportunity that technology provides in unifying these diverse voices are eroding the foundations of patriarchal hegemony.

The witches house where the colonialisits abide is threatened, because we have realised the witch was burnt long ago

Martin Pallister is an independent researcher with an MA in Philosophy. I am hoping to start research for a PHD in feminist philosophy soon. My motivation is for positive change for future generations.

**IS ISLAM AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE WEST?**

Anouar El Younssi
Oxford College of Emory University

The rise and spread of Jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the horrifying atrocities and acts of terror they have perpetrated in various Muslim territories—notably Iraq and Syria—and a number of Western cities are recent events that have raised alarm about the supposed threat Islam poses to Europe—and the West more broadly. Donald Trump, during his campaign for the US presidency, took quite an unprecedented step and promised to ban all Muslims from entering the United States, a promise he partially delivered through an Executive Order—and subsequently a Supreme Court ruling—banning nationals from several Muslim-majority countries. In Europe, the rise of populist, right-wing politics has focused on the threat immigrants—and especially Muslim immigrants—pose to Europe and Western civilization. As researcher Aristotle Kallis has put it:

> In an atmosphere of growing and protracted moral panic, parties of the radical right have led a chorus of hostility to Islam as the unifying theme that drew together fears of “invasion,” “oppression,” “and “colonization” by immigrant Muslims, on the one hand, and the spectre of an all-out global civilizational Armageddon that cast into doubt the very survival of the West.

Indeed, hostility towards Islam and Muslims in the West has become amplified, in our estimation, in the wake of four major signposts in the first two decades of the twenty-first century: First, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US in 2001; second, the global economic recession or crisis that started in 2008 and continued in the following years; third, the rise of the terror group ISIS in 2014 and the terrorist attacks it launched in a number of countries in Europe and the West (most notably in France); and, fourth, the refugee crisis related to the Syrian civil war that began in 2015 and had a tremendous impact on Europe and politics in many parts of the Western world. According to Kallis, since the events of 9/11 the forces of the “radical right has been particularly successful in embedding a menacing conflictual component between Islam and the West”. The othering of Islam and Muslims has thus reached new heights. This politics of othering and scapegoating targeted at Muslims living in the West finds its raison d’être in a civilizational discourse that portrays Islam and its adherents as a threat to Western civilization and way of life. For instance, Dutch politician Geert Wilders has been propagating for many years now a politics of fear targeted against Muslim immigrants in the
Netherlands, and claiming that Islam is an existential threat, not only to the Netherlands and Europe but to the West as a whole. Wilders and his PVV party made significant wins in the Dutch local elections in 2010, gaining more electoral constituents. Following Kallis, “while Islamophobia has become a key ideological and political attribute of the contemporary radical right, it was Wilders and the PVV that offered it a central place in their program and expanded its discursive reach”.

Wilders and the PVV have arguably played a major role in mainstreaming Islamophobia and anti-Muslim rhetoric in Europe and beyond. The fact that the radical right’s bigotry and xenophobia have entered the mainstream discourse in many parts of the European continent is a worrisome development in the twenty-first century. As researcher Ayhan Kaya puts it, European “right-wing populist parties [today] have rather become mainstream political parties appealing to not only working-class, or unemployed social groups but also to women, LGBTI, middle class and upper-middle-class secular groups who feel threatened by radical Salafi Islam”. These populist parties include, in addition to Wilders’ PVV (Party for Freedom), Marine Le Pen’s FN (Front National) in France, Alexander Gauland’s AfD (Alternative for Germany), Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ (Hungarian Civic Alliance) in Hungary, Matteo Salvini’s LN (the Northern League) in Italy, Heinz-Christian Strache’s FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), and others. It is no coincidence that the mainstreaming of these far-right political parties took shape at a time (2014 onwards) that witnessed a- terrorist attacks by ISIS in various European—and North American—locales (France, Belgium, Britain, the US, Canada, etc.) and b- the European migrant crisis, owing in large part to the Syrian civil war. Islam and Muslims, being cast as a threat to Western civilization and the West’s peace and prosperity, were thus key factors in the rise and fast spread of the far right populist parties and their Islamophobic discourse throughout Europe.

With that being said, an important and extremely consequential question arises: Is Islam, an Abrahamic religion with over 1.6 billion adherents, an existential threat to the West? Put differently, is Islam inherently incompatible with liberal Western values? Turkish writer Mustafa Akyol is skeptical of this simplistic claim. In his book *Islam without Extremes*, he argues that Islam can indeed be reconciled to religious, political, economic, and social freedoms. Following Akyol, the rise of Islamist and Jihadist groups in various Muslim-majority countries is symptomatic of a deep crisis within Islam itself. He points out that the Quran (the holy book in Islam) “clearly does not include a definition of government;” that Prophet Muhammad “was silent about political theory;” and that when Muhammad died “the Muslim community had no political blueprint to follow”. Akyol pushes against the widespread belief that the caliphate, as a form of government, is “a requirement of Islam”. Accordingly, today’s Islamists and Jihadists who place the goal of establishing a caliphate at the center of their agendas are extremely misguided. Akyol ultimately reaches a very consequential conclusion, that democracy is the only form of government that fits Muslims today, before adding that secular states which “respect religious freedom” are a desirable option for Muslims. In other words, democracy and secularity—two hallmarks of Western political culture—are not necessarily anti-Islam and do not go against the spirit of the Quran, a view that contradicts the narrative of Islamists and Jihadists today.

It is important to underscore that Islamists and Jihadists, according to British activist Maajid Nawaz, make up a very small minority of the Muslim population. That is, Islamism and
Jihadism—which are “politicized, contemporary readings of Islam”—should not be conflated with Islam, “a traditional religion replete with sects, denominations, and variant readings”. Nawaz is adamant about his argument that that Islamic scripture cannot be assigned a fixed meaning, which leaves the door wide open for reforming Muslims’ understanding of their religion today. By adopting an intellectually-rigorous methodology that, first, departs from the premise that a text lacks an inherent voice or meaning and, second, is embedded in the Islamic tradition of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), Nawaz is able, at least at the conceptual level, to take his reformist project to its logical conclusion, i.e. pluralism. He underscores that once you approach the question of religious scripture using the above methodology, “you’re effectively saying there is no right answer. And in the absence of a right answer, pluralism is the only option. And pluralism will lead to secularism, and to democracy, and to human rights”. Nawaz is certain that if Muslim reformers make a compelling case for, and popularize, the pluralistic nature of interpreting Islamic scripture, the currently war-torn and unstable Arab-Muslim world is bound to regain “peace and stability”. This would also have a bearing on the rest of the world. Violent and terroristic acts inspired or directed by extremist militant groups in Europe, North America, or elsewhere would also be dealt a major blow. In fact, countering and undermining the message of radical groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, is an immediate task of *Quilliam*, a secular organization founded by Nawaz that seeks to challenge and undermine Islamist extremist narratives, and at the same time advocates for pluralistic, democratic values in sync with universal human rights.

**Anouar El Younssi** is an Assistant Professor of Arabic Studies at Oxford College of Emory University in the US. He holds a BA in English Literature and Linguistics; an MA in English; and a PhD in Comparative Literature. His scholarly work explores the wave of literary innovation in Arabic literatures, with a focus on Morocco and the Maghreb. His research seeks to consolidate critical work on literary modernity and the avant-garde in their Arabic and Francophone versions. In addition, Dr. El Younssi has research interests pertaining to discourses in and about Islam in the US, the West, and beyond. His latest publication is titled “Maajid Nawaz, Irshad Manji, and the Call for a Muslim Reformation,” and it appeared in *Politics, Religion & Ideology* journal in 2018.

**MEDIATIZED POPULAR CULTURE IN INDIA AS ‘GAME-CHANGER’ — CHALLENGING ‘WESTERN’ HEGEMONIES IN VIDEO GAMES**

*Xenia Zeiler*

*University of Helsinki*

Video games today are one of the most influential media genres of all and since about 20 years, the study of video games and culture has become a serious field of research in the humanities. Not surprisingly, from the very beginning, the study of games and gaming has been multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary. Games are important because persons of any age, gender and social status either play games themselves and/or are related to games in other ways. This is true for Asia as much as for the ‘West’. In times of “deep mediatization”, persons obtain information and ideas from many sources, including games. As complex, interactive virtual worlds video games thus actively contribute to what actors in society define as norms and values. For instance, game narratives and aesthetics impact on meaning making, in general, and on the construction of society, in particular. Given this it is not surprising that
game development and production often is a complex and highly reflected process, among other things (e.g., business interests) grounded in the understanding of game developers and many influential actors in society that game narratives may design and transform society.

In India, video game development is a rather recent phenomenon. Video games made in India first emerged about ten years ago, and right from the beginning, they featured themes more or less closely related to Indian cultural heritage. The game *Hanuman: Boy Warrior*, a console game produced by Sony for PlayStation 2 in 2009, boasted to be the first Indian video game on console. It featured the Hindu deity Hanuman and his adventures to banish evil demons into the underworld. After this initial game, the game development industry in India quickly and immensely evolved. Between 2010 and 2015, market studies estimated growth rates as high as 30% for the Indian gaming industry. The number of gaming studios exploded from below 20 in around 2010 to more than 500 studios in 2012. One (entirely logical) implication of this development was that game development has become increasingly complex, regarding both technical as well as cultural factors, and that game development overall diversified.

Currently and within the larger video game boom in India, we find an innovative development: a wave of pioneering games from especially so-called indie (independent) companies make extensive use of Indian cultural heritage (e.g., historical/religious references, music, dance, architecture, dress styles elements). This content (in especially narrative and aesthetics) thus is very consciously set apart from the so-far dominant narratives of games produced by the established and market-dominating ‘Western’ game producing regions (especially the USA and Europe). With this, India has charted a highly interesting and distinctive path in the experimentation with the potential of video games which currently is done by game developers globally.

For example, we find games which are set in Indian contexts and have an educational character. *Missing*, winner of Nasscom Indie Game of the Year award in 2016, was developed by Flying Robots in Kolkata in collaboration with the missing art campaign. In the game, you play as a girl who is the victim of human trafficking. While trying to find your way to freedom you are exposed to the theme of human trafficking in India, and specifically to the struggles of girls when abducted. Also *Mukti* (forthcoming) by underdogs and wandermind labs Mumbai, which has won the 2017 NASSCOM Upcoming Game award, addresses human trafficking and takes up issues of child prostitution and AIDS. But additionally, the game is based inside an Indian Museum and explicitly aims at showcasing Indian Culture and Heritage.

This paper aims at presenting an overview of the developments in India and at locating them in the wider fields of cultural and social transformations in Asia – transformations which are closely intertwined with the mediatization of societies worldwide. It also discusses methodical questions, by relating game research in India to the approach of “gameenvironments”. While the Indian indie game development scene is still relatively young, it has already lived through big changes. Like in many regions worldwide, indie game developers in India have to negotiate between practical issues, for example regarding market requirements and expectations, and committed ambitions, for example regarding creative aspirations in art design and game content. On the one hand and in order to persist in the ever extending industry, they need to acknowledge mainstream wants and practical demands from especially (though not exclusively) the Indian game market which at present is characterized by an overall dominance of mobile card and casino games. On the other hand, we see that especially Indian indie
developers increasingly reflect on the role of Indian cultural heritage (including elements from history, architecture, music, etc.) for India produced games.

**MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY — FROM EAST TO WEST AND FROM WEST TO EAST?**

Reetta Frosti  
University of Helsinki

In *Novum organum* in 1620 the English natural philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) listed the three most important innovations of his time: “the art of printing, gunpowder and the nautical compass”. But now it is well known that those innovations came from ancient China. Also today Chinese technical equipment is taking over the global market share. Still there are many people who think that all sciences are western.

In my paper I discuss the history of global, not western, modern science. I point out that modern science was born by mixed cultures in the Middle Ages and the early modern times in Europe. Some scholars argue that in the east – mostly in the Arabic cultures and states – the progress of science collapsed after the Middle Ages. This is something that should be examined more in the future. And what about the Chinese? Did they forget science or has science been there all the time? Was it waiting for the comeback – for example – in the form of Chinese smartphones? Or have the Chinese taken the so-called western world’s progress as a ready-made packet? Or does scientific thinking – and science – just need the right time and place to break through? I have already asked similar questions in my article “On the myth of western science” in 2016. Its focus is more in the Arabic culture and science and Francis Bacon’s influence on the later thoughts of modern western science. Now my point of view is more in the global history of science, especially in the Chinese scientific thinking and what kind of way technology has made from the ancient times to the present. As a historian of religion my interest is in history.

All these questions above, I analyse now through conceptual history. Conceptual history itself as a methodology has a European background, for instance Reinhart Koselleck’s studies. The phenomenon is under examination in the book *Global Conceptual History. A Reader* of 2016. It gives me the right tools to analyse such concepts as eastern, western, and scientific thinking. With conceptual history I also use critical discourse analysis as my method.

As Toby E. Huff writes in his *The Rise of Early Modern Science. Islam, China and West* published in 1999, “science at its heart is systematic and theoretical knowledge” and that “it is episteme as opposed to techne”. If one thinks that technology is a part of modern science then China was much ahead of other cultures before the so-called Scientific Revolution in Western Europe in the early modern times. In nineteenth-century Europe it was already well known that gunpowder, art of printing and compass were all Chinese innovations. In my point of view Huff is a good example of a historian of science to whom technology is not a part of modern science and since Chinese scientific thinking was mostly techne it makes it easy to disqualify Chinese scientists.
Humans as well as their ideas have always moved across boundaries. There have been interconnections and influences which turned into the so-called Scientific Revolution in Renaissance Europe. What comes to science and its history, it is nowadays clear that there was no sudden Revolution and many different cultures and nations were important tools to modern science. So today it is more proper to speak about global modern science than western modern science, if we need any specification. Language is the problem for historians these days. Most of global history is written in European languages, nowadays mostly, of course, in English, the modern lingua franca. Margrit Pernau and Dominic Sachsenmaier write that “global historians are increasingly becoming aware of the mutuality of influence between colonial powers and their colonies”.

Intellectual history and the history of ideas (shortly: the history of the scientific thought) have had “Eurocentric grounds” for a long time. The Chinese and other non-Europeans were looked at through the western lens. European scientists and the historians of science decided what scientific thinking was and who could be called a scientist. In my paper I examine how Chinese scientific thinking is narrated in their own tradition (according to Boddle and Sivin) and how, on the other hand, it has been described in western scientific history (Boddle 1991, Sivin 1995). At the same time I try to understand why it was important to speak about eastern and western sciences in the history of science.

Reeta Frosti is a PhD student of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. She is studying Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy. She is interested in Bacon’s way to expresses the masculinity and religion in his philosophical writings, and the culture of the Early Modern Era of England.

MODERNITY AS WESTERN MONOPOLY: THE HEGEMONIC NATIONAL NARRATIVE OF JAPAN IN THE WEST

Jordi Serrano Muñoz
Pompeu Fabra University

In my presentation, I would like to explore how the way Japan was described in Western public discourse from 1868 to today as an identity at odds with modernity enabled a framing of the Japanese as a subaltern nation, legitimizing the Western discursive position of superiority in situations of conflict. This statement departs from the idea that the project of modernity in all its dimensions (political, technological, industrial, social, but also cultural) has been embedded as the legitimizing axiom that ensures domination in the post-Enlightenment world. According to decolonial theory, the project of modernity produces and sustains subalternity in its structural articulation of material subsistence and dialectical legitimation. In order for modernity in all its fronts (extractivist capitalism, Western cultural imperialism disguised as universal values, and liberal democracy, for instance) to keep existing under the system of Western global authority, it requires the construction of a non-modern subject, the subaltern, to sustain a hierarchy of development that would justify material exploitation. In the case of Japan, this same system would be used to enforce not direct plunder of the country, but the deprivation of the potential contender’s authority within this same structure of supremacy.
I will present a journey through the main tropes of the hegemonic national narrative of Japan as it has been produced and reproduced from one of the main focus of Western power, the United States. The correspondence between the construction of Japan’s national representation in the United States and the interests of Western powers is revealed when following its chronological development. It goes from an initial position of portrayed meekness to the eventual depiction of the Japanese as an unconditional adversary during World War II, to shift back to friendliness out of the political needs of the Cold War and later alliance under the dynamics of globalization.

The case of Japan is paradigmatic of a portrayed identity that cannot be dismissed as non-modern, but cannot be fully integrated either as “modern” if the West is to keep its paramount position. Any form of suspicion cast upon Japan’s modernity ensures therefore Western authority. I organize the identified tropes constituting the hegemonic narrative as part of a combined strategy with two pillars. First, the hegemonic narrative understands Japan in a superficially instrumental relationship with modernity. The Japanese are accused of embracing the enterprise of modernizing their state and society exclusively as a means to acquire and develop a technological level equivalent to the West. This discourse has been nursed especially at times in which Japanese autonomous political agenda clashed with Western powers’ interests. The idea of a Japan that “uses” modernity instead of “becoming” modern fundamentally entails the estrangement between the formulation of a community’s defining identity and the articulation of its policies and institutions.

The second pillar of the hegemonic narrative is the construction of the Japanese identity assuming a so-called essence comprised solely of elements that predate the contact with the West and the development of a modern state. Geishas and samurai: the reduction of Japanese culture to traits and practices hailed as referential of an essence preordained and fossilized as “tradition.” The trope of a Japan that is modern on the outside and traditional on the inside is coupled by the pinpointing of its cultural identity in pre-industrial referents.

Decolonial theory is built from the axis of denouncing modernity as a European narrative that disguises a world phenomenon as a Western patent. Therefore, any attempts conducted by peripheral nations of accepting the terms of the recipe of modernity as it has been deployed in the West will never challenge hegemony because they function within the same system. The matrix of power appropriates history to hail modernity as the cornerstone of any possible understanding of civilization. The project of modernity and its consubstantial structures of domination establish a “before” and an “after” that essentializes the subaltern by not allowing it to claim a modern status. The contradiction produced by Japan’s status as a ‘developed’ agent with an identity framed before modernity are exceptionalized to avoid suggesting a real alternative to the system of coloniality. In order to do so, Japan’s national narrative in the West, like that of other subaltern identities as denounced in decolonial thought, is built and reproduced as an object deprived of enunciating agency.

I base these notions on the idea that Western hegemony needs to be assessed and analyzed as sustained not only through economic, political, and military dominance but also through the imposition of an epistemic framework that defines the Other in terms that favor the West. On the one hand, the mere existence of the West as a historical and socio-politically constructed identity depends on the design and perpetuation of this Other on top of which to erect and
justify its superiority. On the other, it could be argued that this dependency inevitably produces periodic crisis of survival. Western powers create and maintain the idea of the Other for it allows the West to exist by opposition. The mechanism that reinforces the logic of identity formation is precisely the fear of this Other taking over their position of dominance. This dynamic entails that the idea of the West is stronger the more imperiled it feels; and for the West to be stronger, it needs a clearer and solider Other, galvanizing the same mechanisms that activate its fear of extinction. The Other needs to be a fierce enemy, but not powerful enough to actually be able to prevail. The West’s claimed monopoly over modernity automatically delegitimizes any potential contenders, no matter their manifested level of development.

This logic of legitimation only works because the West still holds material hegemony over the rest of the world. We cannot assume that this situation will remain unchanged forever. A scenario where non-Western powers rise to replace the West as the controllers of hegemony is more than feasible. We need to question then how will future hegemonic powers establish their legitimacy. Are they going to act within the paradigm of modernity? Could alternative hegemonic powers turn this system against the West to subalternize it? Could we find ourselves integrating a discursive framework where the West gets its modern identity problematized? If we are to ask whether the structures that hold the so-called legitimate claim of the West to be hegemonic can prevail, I maintain that we need to pay attention to whether the West is able to sustain its imaginary monopoly on modernity as its definer identity trait.

Jordi Serrano Muñoz is a PhD candidate at the Pompeu Fabra University. He completed a Degree in East Asian Studies from the Autonomous University of Barcelona and a Research Master in Literary Studies from Leiden University. He is also co-editor and co-founder of Asiademica: Open Journal of East Asian Studies.

PASSING OF THE IDEA OF JAPAN AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST

Pekka Korhonen
University of Jyväskylä

Japan has for decades been depicted as a “Bridge between the East and the West” - by various Japanese authors and politicians. The concept has been intimately connected with Japan’s historical rising power status in the international system, where it has been standing in the middle ground between leading Euroamerican powers on one hand and neighbouring East Asian countries on the other. The constellations have changed over the past century and half, but whether the activity has been on the cultural, or economic, or military, it has involved Japanese attempts to shape the Asian environment into its favour. Now by 2019 this metaphor has completely disappeared.

We know the reason; on one hand, China has eclipsed Japan as the greatest economic and military power in Asia, and on the other, many other Asian countries are highly modernized nowadays, and Japan does not in any way stand out. Instead of the reason, my interest in this paper is the temporal dimension: when did this change actually happen, i.e., when and how was Japan talked out of its metaphoric bridge position into that of an ordinary Asian country - which nevertheless is still closely allied and aligned with the West. I approach the topic by reading how Japanese and
Chinese leading politicians have depicted their states as actors in world politics in general and in Asia in particular. I will keep the analysis simple and proceed with Kenneth Burke’s methodological idea, the representative anecdote, as a guide in concentrating on certain key arguments presented in specific points of time. Burke’s own criterion for selecting representative anecdotes was locations “wherein human relations grandly converge”; I will look for arguments where state relations grandly converge.

The ultimate theoretical model for Japan’s bridge position has been Akamatsu Kaname’s (1896-1974) Theory of the Flying Geese Pattern of Development. According to this theory a less developed but dynamic country simply imports all kinds of culture, technology, organizational forms, etc. from more advanced countries, building up its economy and society during the process towards more sophisticated levels. The process also involves a thorough transformation of the culture of the receiving country so that its society fits better with the new technological and organizational levels. However, after it has advanced far enough, it becomes a model for less developed countries to import cultural elements from it. This process is what Japan did more rapidly and successfully from the late nineteenth century onwards. The ideological expression that was developed on the basis of this economic process was Greater Asianism while Japan’s central location in the flow of culture can be seen even in Sun Yat Sen’s Asianist arguments. The greater Japan’s national power grew, the more forceful became ideas of actively shaping Japan’s Asian neighbourhood, leading to the attempt to create the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere during World War II. After its collapse these cultural exporting attempts towards Asia were narrowed to the economic sphere, with Akamatsu’s pupil Kojima Koyoshi being the most important theoretician. In the 1960s he started advocating the creation of a Pacific Free Trade Area among the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, with Southeast Asia countries added to the structure as adjuncts, positioning Japan as the essential mediator between the Western and Asian countries. In terms of theory, Kojima added to Akamatsu’s theory the element of active Japanese productive investment towards the Asian countries. This is the origin of current forms of Asian Pacific integration, including such organizations as APEC and CPTPP.

In 2010 China passed Japan in terms of the size of its GDP, becoming the second largest economy in the world, after the United States. China continued its growth, while Japanese economic growth has been at the European levels, so that the game about the top Asian position was over. This ended also the narrative of Japan as an economic great power and a source of grand regional political initiatives. To be the third largest economy of the world is of course not a mean achievement, but the economic great power argument always contained within it the temporal future oriented idea that number two can become number one, if growth only continues. This had not happened, and thus the category of future grandeur was closed, and with it disappeared also the great power conceptualization. Hatoyama Yukio, the first prime minister (2009-2010) of the Japan Democratic Party, in his speeches simply placed Japan into the position of a relatively small country between the great powers of the United States and China, and that is where Japan essentially has been ever since. China has instead become very active in the field of international initiatives. With the rise of Xi Jinping to Chinese presidency in 2013 Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of biding one’s time was changed to 奋发有为 (fènfā yǒuwéi, “exerting oneself daringly”, or “striving for achievement”), which meant that China from then on should take an active stance in world politics, commensurate with its new undeniable great power status. This soon lead into a stream of new ideas, of which the Belt and Road initiative is the most well known.
If an Asian bridge country can be thought to exist nowadays, it certainly is China, which has become the biggest trade partner of the greatest part of the countries in the world system. However, when one discusses this matter with Chinese colleagues, they do not get especially exited about the bridge metaphor. They are not used to thinking with that kind of concept. Thus, apparently no Bridge between the East and the West exists in East Asia nowadays in the old sense, but perhaps such a state is not needed.

Pekka Korhonen works as a professor of world politics at the University of Jyväskylä. I was born during the early Cold War, and with luck may live long enough to see the early part of a new Cold War. I have also lived a number of years in East Asia, mostly in Japan, for shorter periods also in some of the Chinas and Koreas. I sometimes teach general world political topics, geopolitics and narrative theory, but most of my research and also teaching relates to East Asia. North Korea is my latest main interest, but not the only one.

http://users.jyu.fi/~pkonen/PekkaKorhonenJYU/Etusivu.html

POSTSOCIALISM(S) AS ASSEMBLAGE: CONDUCTING RESEARCH WITHOUT RECREATING POWER RELATIONS

Iuliia Gataulina
Tampere University

Assemblage theorizing has gained a prominent weight in different fields of studies, including International Relations. It suggests the new ways of conducting the research, i.e. the processes of knowing and relating to the world. Drawing from the Deleuzian thinking, which undermines the concepts of structure and builds on the pluralities and interconnectedness of the parts and realities the world consists of, assemblage theorizing reimagines the notion of space, interrelations between the local and the global, and connections and power relations among different locales. Therefore, assemblage theorizing offers to us the new ways to analyse the issues of context and their interrelations in the world.

One of such widely recognized and discussed (both in academia and in politics) contexts has been postsocialism(s): different territories, locales, and communities, which have experienced similar economic and political implications of the socialist system in the past and then have gone through the so-called “transition” periods trying to join the capitalist structures. However, the scholarship on postsocialism in the academia was not born as “ingenious” critique (as it happened with postcolonialism), but rather has been a production of Western scholars in order to analyse the former Communist bloc. The term, in the end, has been adopted by the native scholars; however, its Western epistemology played its role in forming the analytical tool of postsocialism, which geographically was applied to the so-called “second world” and temporarily, to the process of economic and political transition. Thus, from the beginning, the studies about, and representations of, “the second world”/postsocialist societies became the comparison with the “first world” (the west) and, therefore, sustained the status of the postsocialist ‘other’. Moreover, in the times of transition, different “Western” policies and reforms were introduced to the former socialist bloc; in the academic research, there is still a tendency to analyse how the “Western”, ready-to-be-implemented, policies have been transferred to the postsocialist countries and how successfully (or not?) they have been adopted – again, to the comparison to their “Western model”.

44
The paper tries to examine the topic of postsocialism(s) through the lenses of assemblage theorizing emphasizing how the places and bodies, including the postsocialist ones, are constructed with different parts coming from different places: such parts of the assemblage represent socialist traditions from the past with the capitalist innovations after 1990s. Emphasizing postsocialist assemblages, the research has an opportunity to go beyond the dichotomies of East/West and to deconstruct the power relations between the realities of “the First” and “the Second” worlds. Postsocialist locales are constructed with parts coming from the near and the far, i.e. from the socialist/postsocialist and the so-called “Western”. All of these parts play an equal role in constructing the places; thus, assemblage theorizing helps to map the postsocialist terrains into the world picture on the equal terms.

The assemblage approach towards postsocialism(s) seems to be very helpful especially when analyzing transfer processes. Oftentimes, the research studies how “Western” (especially, European) policies are adopted in the postsocialist countries; such research also tries to evaluate the process of implementation seeing a policy model as a product of “the West”. The assemblage approach helps us to see difficult trajectories policies take, and different forms they might transform into depending on the paths, actors, subjectivities, power relations, etc. Thus, postsocialist assemblages question Western hegemonies since they deconstruct the dichotomy between West and East.

Such postsocialist assemblages are possible to trace through any policies that has travelled there through different trajectories. My research is analysing one of such examples: the Bologna process in the Russian universities. The Bologna process is a higher education reform, first introduced in European countries and then expanded to other different states. Russia joined the Bologna process in 2003, and since then, has been reforming the higher education system in the country according to the Bologna. The rhetoric of the implementation process often emphasizes how successfully the Bologna process is adopted, and how fast Russia moves towards the “ideal” policy model. At the same time, the Bologna process is often seen as of an “external” production, which is distinguished from the “previous”, or even “traditional”, higher education system. From the assemblage point of view, all of those parts come together and create a new unique assemblage. In the end, assemblage approach does not try to compare, or to rate, implemented policies, thereby constructing postsocialist “other” and sustaining the idea of the “normalized” West; but rather utilizes a different kind of discourse, which emphasizes the uniqueness and equity of different realities.

Thus, I argue that analysing the postsocialist locales from the perspective of the assemblage theorizing offers us a new way of doing research, which critics the discourse on Three Worlds systems and tries to bypass the recreation of existing power relations between the postsocialist communities and other locales, especially, from the so-called First World; in the end, it is appropriate to say that postsocialist assemblages question Western hegemonies.

Iuliia Gataulina is a PhD researcher in the EduNeighbours project: “Towards good neighbourliness with higher education cooperation” hosted by the Faculty of Management and Business at Tampere University and funded by Kone Foundation; the topic of her PhD is “Assembling Neoliberal University: The Case of the Bologna process in Russia.”
POST-WESTERN VISIONS FROM THE EAST: TIANXIA AND THE CHINESE ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF WORLD POLITICS

Matti Puranen
University of Jyväskylä

As the Western liberal world order keeps faltering, rising China has been increasingly confident and vocal in its criticism of the order and its injustices. The rhetoric of the Communist party leadership claims that the Western model of global governance has ‘lost its steam’ and is unable to solve the various problems of the global era. As a “responsible great power”, China has to step up and offer its power as well as its wisdom for helping the mankind to survive. Within China’s academic circles, scholars of world politics are developing “indigenously Chinese” ideas and theories to support China’s efforts for reforming the international order. Perhaps the most notable of these theoretical initiatives is the so called “tianxia theory” (天下论, tianxia lun), which claims that the current international order as well as the ‘hegemonic’ interpretations of international politics supporting it are not to be taken as universal. They are only products of particular historical developments within the Western civilization, in which the equal and sovereign states and their interactions became the central institutions of international politics. The West, because of its military and economic supremacy, has forced this model upon the rest of the world, but the model is getting increasingly ineffective in answering to the challenges posed by globalization.

According to tianxia theory, Chinese civilization evolved in remarkably different conditions. From the very beginning of history, China developed a conception of politics which was based on the whole world – all under Heaven – unified under a benevolent central institution. This was materialized in the institutional structure of the tributary system, in which the Chinese emperor served as a leading core and the smaller political units were its vassals or tributaries. Within this system, the tianxia theorists claim, sovereignty and equality of the political units was no doubt limited, but the system as a whole was much more peaceful and tolerant. The tianxia system – according to the theorists – collapsed under the pressure of Western great powers during the 19th century, but it should now be resurrected as it would be better suited for the era of deepening globalization. The theorists attempt to develop a modern variant of the ancient tianxia order; in modern (Western) terms, some kind of a cosmopolitan world federation, in which the sovereignty of individual states would be seriously limited.

The concept of tianxia is feeding the imagination of political thinkers in China, and even the party leadership – including president Xi Jinping – is using the concept. However, nobody seems to be quite certain, what an actual world order based on tianxia would look like and how it could be established. Descriptions of the new tianxia are vague to say the least, and the whole ‘theory’ seems to merely offer rhetorical material for criticizing the ‘hegemony’ of the West, and for developing a unique and grandiose great power identity for China after socialism.

If the tianxia theory is to serve as anything more than mere rhetoric and if it is to contribute for the solving of the various problems of the global era, it should offer some new, concrete propositions which are clearly presented. In my paper, I am studying the ongoing academic discussion on tianxia theory, attempting to clarify what kind of a world order a new global tianxia would actually be, and if the theory indeed possesses such unique elements as the theorists are claiming. To do this, I am comparing tianxia with chosen established theories of international
relations and global governance which have attempted, quite similarly, to stabilize the disorder
of international great power politics. I will first compare tianxia theory with hegemonic stability
theories (as conceptualized by such authors as Robert Gilpin, Charles Kindleberger and Robert
Keohane) which, quite similarly to tianxia, claim that a stable and peaceful international order
should have a stabilizing central power, a hegemon, which would sacrifice some of its power for
offering ‘public goods’ for the benefit of the world. I will then move on to compare tianxia with
liberalist theories, focusing especially on John Ikenberry’s theory of a constitutional international
order. Ikenberry has proposed, in line with other liberal arguments, that a stable and peaceful
world order will require a constitutional arrangement, which would be agreed by all the states
and which would also tie the states together with its institutional network. Finally, I will compare
tianxia theory with cosmopolitan theories, as developed by David Held, Thomas Pogge and
Daniele Archibugi. Cosmopolitan tradition has for hundreds (or even thousands) of years
imagined a democratically ruled, unified world, in which the sovereignty of the nation-states
would be limited, thus being ideationally very close to tianxia theory.

The three groups chosen for this article are definitely not the only theories dealing with the issues
of grand scale normative world politics. One could easily expand the scope of the article by
discussing theories such as functionalism and neo-functionalism or even the sketches of world
government developed during the early 20th century. For the purposes of this short paper,
however, the three theoretical groups are serving as a small ‘sample’ for demonstrating that ideas
similar to tianxia have been proposed and discussed in the field of international politics for a long
time, and that the claims about tianxia theory’s “uniqueness” can be questioned. The idea in my
paper is not to debunk tianxia theory as being merely hollow rhetoric, but to guide the discussion
away from arbitrarily generated divisions between “Western theories” and “Chinese theories”,
which is not at all helpful for the commonly shared project of building ‘a world truly shared by all’
(天下大同, tianxia datong).

Matti Puranen (MA, MSSc) is a doctoral candidate (Political Science) at the Department of Social
Science and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, from which he graduated in General History
and Political Science in 2014. His dissertation focuses on Chinese thinking on world politics
and global governance, especially on the use traditional philosophical concepts (such as “tianxia”) in
contemporary debates. Puranen has been teaching at the National Defence University of Finland
and University of Lapland and works as a contributing editor at the Finnish online magazine on
international affairs, The Ulkopoliitist.

RACE AND NATION IN INTER-EAST ASIAN FRIENDSHIPS MADE IN THE WEST

Yuko Kawai
Rikkyo University
Tokyo, JAPAN

Race and nation are embedded in the ideas of Asia and the West. Asia and the West have been
the two significant discursive Others for what it means to be Japanese since the late 19th
century. The two geo-ideological concepts are closely related to the Western concept of race,
or more specifically the two Western racial categories: the yellow race and the white race.
Against the backdrops of Western colonialism and imperialism, 19th century Western discourses depicted Asia—often represented by China—as opposite to the West: static versus
Dynamic, despotic versus democratic, and backward versus progressive. Asia was a category that modern Japanese elites and intellectuals wanted to shed and simultaneously needed as a source of cultural difference to construct Japanese identity vis-à-vis the West.

This study examines how race and nation are implicated in friendships that Japanese students make with East Asian students when they participate in a study abroad program in the West. In the globalizing world of the 21st century, Japan has become simultaneously more interconnected with and disconnected from its neighboring East Asian countries. Korean popular culture has gone mainstream in Japan, and Japanese politicians and academics once actively discussed East Asian regionalism, such as creating the East Asian Community. At the same time, postcolonial and territorial disputes as well as the rise of their economies and the relative decline of Japan’s have tainted Japanese perceptions of China and South Korea. In an annual governmental survey on Japanese people’s attitude toward neighboring states in Asia Pacific region, their negative attitude toward China and South Korea recorded all-time lows of 83.2% and 66.4% in 2014 and 2013 respectively since the 1970s. Although the rates improved since then (76.4% toward China and 58.0% toward South Korea in 2018), this is contrastive to their far less negative attitude toward the United States (22.4%) and Australia (29.0%).

Many national governments and higher educational institutions, including those in Japan, are encouraging students to participate in a study abroad program, responding to demands and challenges arising from globalization. The Japanese government has supported a limited number of Japanese elites to American and European higher educational institutions since the mid-19th century to gain “advanced” Western knowledge and technologies. However, in 2013, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) launched the study-abroad promotional campaign called “Tobitate (Leap for Tomorrow) Japan” and began to offer study-abroad scholarships on a broader scale with financial contributions from major Japanese corporations to double the number of Japanese people studying abroad by 2020. The background of this policy is the lack of “globally minded talent” pointed out by “roughly 70 percent of Japanese companies with operations outside of Japan”. Especially Japanese university students participating in short-term (from a few weeks to one year) study-abroad programs increased from 40,158 in 2010 to 68,156 in 2013 and to 103,279 in 2017.

Western English-speaking countries, such as the United States, Britain, Australia, and Canada, are most popular destinations for Japanese university students. More than 40 percent of the study-abroad program participants in 2017 went to these four countries. However, often for the first time in their life, they come to interact closely with other East Asian students in those Western countries. Despite the tensions and negative perceptions toward China and South Korea, I frequently hear Japanese students who have studied in a Western country say that they became most friendly with students from China, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Japanese students participate in a short-term study-abroad program in the West not only because they hope to improve their foreign language (mostly English) skills but also because they are often more interested in Euro-American cultures than Asian cultures. Then why do they become friends with other Asian students there? How does such an experience transform their views of Asia and themselves? How are race and nation implicated in their friendships?

I begin this study with a historical discussion of Japan’s ideas of Asia, which are necessarily intertwined with those of the West. Then analyzing interviews conducted with fourteen Japanese university students who participated in a short-term study abroad program in a
Western country between 2013 and 2017, I examine how race and nation are intersected in their inter-East Asian friendships made in the West and thereby explore possibilities and problematics embedded there.

Yuko Kawai is Professor of Communication in the College of Intercultural Communication at Rikkyo University located in Tokyo. Her research interests lie in Japanese cultural nationalism, racism, and multiculturalism. She is particularly interested in critically examining and transforming the dominant idea of Japaneseness. Her recent works in English are: “The Grammar of Japanese Racialized Discourse in Hate-Korea Books,” Asia Review 8(1), (Seoul National University Asia Center 2018); “Intersecting Japanese Nationalism and Racism as Everyday Practices” in Multiculturalism in East Asia: A Transnational Exploration of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Rowman & Littlefield 2016). She is currently working on a book project in which she critiques the construction of Japaneseness from a transnational perspective.

**SOVIET EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN THE 1960S: CONTESTING WESTERN HEGEMONIES IN THE SPHERE OF HIGHER EDUCATION?**

Riikkamari Muhonen  
Central European University – Budapest, Hungary

Internationalism was re-introduced to Soviet foreign policy agenda after the death of Stalin and a long period of relative isolationism during late Stalinism. This new development was visible in events, such as Festival of Youth and Students organized in Moscow in 1957, and in active building of new global contacts. The Soviet foreign policy strategy of the late 1950s and the 1960s was tightly connected to decolonization taking place all around the world as colonized territories were gaining their independence. These newly-independent states also provided an opportunity to spread the Soviet sphere of influence to new territories around the globe. Thus, wide-scale Soviet cooperation with the developing world started. This cooperation had many different forms, such as Soviet-funded construction projects, sharing new Soviet technological innovations, sending Soviet experts abroad, founding Soviet research institutions dedicated to developing areas, and receiving students from the developing world to gain their education in Soviet universities.

Even after the independence, the educated elites of the developing world still mostly obtained their higher education degrees either in the West or in local universities that employed faculty with Western degrees. Education soon became one of the most important fields of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the developing world, with thousands of students studying in hundreds of Soviet institutions of higher education around the country. A similar development took place around the socialist bloc, with most eastern European socialist states receiving significant amounts of foreign students. The first students from the developing world arrived in the Soviet Union after the Bandung conference in the late 1950s and continued to flow into the country throughout the periods of late socialism and perestroika. However, most of the students arriving to the Soviet Union were specializing in technical fields of study, such as engineering, agriculture and medicine, while lawyers, journalists, teachers and specialists of state administration and politics still gained their education in the West.
In addition, the Soviet administration stressed the non-ideological nature of the education provided to its partners to encourage countries around the world to allow their youth to study in the Soviet Union. For example, in the Peoples’ Friendship University that was founded in Moscow in 1960 specifically to welcome students from the developing world, it was possible to study topics such as natural sciences or engineering until 1968 without any courses of ideological contents included in the degrees themselves. This was another problem for the Soviet administration, because in practice it was possible to graduate and leave the Soviet Union without any ideological training that would promote the spread of socialism into the developing world. Thus, ideological activities organized during holidays and other leisure time of the students were of major importance. During the summers the students were encouraged to participate in excursions around the Soviet Union or to spend their holidays in kolkhozes or building projects. Especially the areas that had experienced or were currently experiencing rapid development, such as Central Asia, Siberia and the Virgin Lands of Kazakh steppe, were of major importance in portraying development. This was a concrete example of the “non-capitalist path of development” that was the key model of development promoted in the developing world by the Soviet Union. The holiday experiences supplemented the experiences of “Soviet reality” the students gathered in Moscow through visits to museums, concerts and other cultural events, as well as factories and schools, where the students had a chance to experience the everyday life of Soviet workers and make friends with them.

However, the Soviet reality that the students experienced during their stay in the Soviet Union was more diverse than the one they were experiencing during organized excursions. In addition to witnessing development and enjoying international friendship, the students also experienced racist attacks and suffered difficulties related to everyday life in the Soviet Union, such as lack of goods in shops. In other words, many of them left the Soviet Union disillusioned by the realities of socialism. It seems that the attitudes of alumni towards the Soviet Union were varied: according to Soviet reports of the era, some of them remained in close contact with Soviet embassies and cultural institutes and were willing to talk about their positive experiences while studying in the Soviet Union, while other graduates presented openly hostile attitudes towards the Soviet Union by engaging in anti-Soviet political movements and talking openly about the negative sides of the Soviet society.

In other words, it remains difficult to estimate whether the Soviet educational cooperation with the developing world was able to seriously contest the Western hegemony of higher education. Most students still obtained their degrees in the West and even among those who graduated from Soviet institutions only a relatively small percentage was interested in actively engaging in politics and social change in their countries of origin in the ways expected by the Soviet authorities. The situation forced the Soviet administration itself to question already by the late 1960s whether their attempt in contesting the Western hegemony of higher education had been successful. Still, during the three decades until the breakup of the Soviet Union, its institutions of higher education produced thousands of graduates that in many cases were employed to local state administration and research institutions, thus spreading Soviet expertise and educational model to new territories.

Riikkamari Muhonen is a PhD candidate at Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. Her dissertation project concentrates on higher education as part of the Soviet Union’s Cold War era foreign policy strategy towards the developing world by analyzing the activities of Moscow-based Peoples’ Friendship University in the 1960s and 1970s.
TERRORISM AND THE END OF WESTERN HEGEMONY: A GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE

Chloé Lala-Guyard
Sciences Po / La Sorbonne Paris IV

If Francis Fukuyama wrote “the end of history and the Last man” in 1989, his diagnosis of the end of the universalization of western norms has never been so accurate. Indeed, an anti-western hegemonic influence is a rampant epiphenomenon in today’s global politics. Orchestrated by Russia and China, a counter-globalization is on its way. Through its “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, China is re-shaping the face of the world economy through its new trade routes questioning the US world economic system. Lurking behind, India follows suit by bridging the gap within the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, Russia’s late involvement in Syria epitomized that history was following another direction than the previous one led by Western voices. While other BRICS countries’ economic power increases, their place is still not heard fueling their dissatisfaction. As Erbert and Maurer suggests, “The emergence of a coalition between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa has substantiated the assumption of a concerted counter-hegemonic movie...”. In the Arab world, Islamism has often been pointed out as the natural response to the western interference in the region. Al Qaeda and ISIS have become the tantamount of the so-called “war against the West”. As such, terrorism can be understood as a counter-hegemonic strategy caused by an emotional/affective wound left by the American invasion. Reconsidering the Gramscian concept of counter hegemony shed light on how critical it is to consider emotions and affects as political motivations to challenge hegemonic norms. In this context, the Gramscian notion of counter-hegemony allows to-re-read the rise of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS through a cultural lens.

Terrorism as a counter hegemonic resistance

Counter-hegemony is essentially a process through which an individual A challenge the normative and political opinions spread by an individual B and acknowledged by the majority such as the idea that the western economic norms and cultural vision is the only option available. Indeed, for Gramsci the process of counterhegemony is symbiotically linked to an affective realm because our experience and understanding of the world are necessarily intertwined with feelings. Along this line, affects and emotions become the central pivot motivating social and political transformation towards counter-hegemonic responses. Al Qaeda’s rise blatantly illustrates such interpretation. Indeed, the organization arose as a violent reaction to the American invasion of Iraq. The latter was thus understood as an aggression against the east. Bin Laden thus developed a victim narrative arguing that “we have to fight a defensive jihad against the invading enemy at the time of his initial attack, refusing to submit and resisting that enemy until we die trying”, legitimizing a terrorist initiative. The sentence embodies the emotional and affective insult and reinforced a logic of “us” versus “them” understood as a defensive jihad against a perceived cultural disease coming from the west i.e. a counter-hegemonic resistance. Al Qaeda’s leader also analyzed Bush’s vision as a paternalist/patronizing behavior. Thus, from the enemy’s perspective, the war on terror is applied to countries that can’t speak for themselves also known as terrorist states within the American imagined communities. Beyond the narratives, Gramsci posits that such resistance
“presupposes the formation of a new set of standards, a new psychology, new ways of feeling, thinking and living”. This process is allowed through the cement of the terrorist ideology that re-creates a mental universe structured by a radically different understanding and analysis of the same historical moment. As such the extremist religious interpretation provides a meaning to the affects caused by a plausible cultural wound.

**ISIS’s innovative anti-western colonization response**

ISIS’ caliphate also subscribe to a form of political strategy against a western domination. The former’s Grand Strategy is designed to “remain and expand” by maximizing its interests - the caliphate epitomizing its ideology - “to all current Muslim countries in the world and fight and win the apocalyptic war against the West” .The caliphate is even more interesting since it appears almost 5 centuries after the first one. Symbolically, the last Ottoman Empire climaxed during the 16th century before Atatürk’s republic. The later encouraged a wave of Occidentalist shutting down any attempt to preserve the oriental culture from the western invasion. ISIS’s caliphate thus ressonates as a significant revival of this specific era – preserved of any of the western barbarism. The caliphate is nothing but the realization of the prophecy of destroying the western domination over the Islamic territories. According to the strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, the world order, led by the United States, would “never accept a state ruled by Islamic law” because “such a state had its own civilization and its own ideology, independent of the World Order”. Although, ISIS strategy is more universalist than Al Qaeda’s counterhegemonic response. Yet, more globally, it seems that ISIS sought to detain a political space within the international order likely to interfere and even to force the West to reconceptualize its certainty.

**Passion, leaders, and critical reflexivity in terrorist organizations**

Affects, emotions and passion thus represent critical leverages functions of societal transformation and political responses of a hegemonic status quo. For that counter-hegemonic strategy to take place, “Counter-hegemonic leaders, then, must be mindful to align themselves with the subaltern in a way that resonates with their passions (emotional lives and understanding) as well as with their lived experiences”. This fine understanding of “subalterns” feelings and cultural wounds and their enmeshment within ideology is quintessential to the implementation of counter-hegemonic practices. This subaltern resistance thus fuels a critical reflexivity of the group. Terrorist leaders such as Bin laden, Al Baghdadi and Al Zarqawi thus played an important role on politically preparing the “subaltern groups” (jihadist fighters) hence the hunt and elimination of terrorist leaders portrayed as symbols of victory within the western mythology. Therefore, an “educational relationship” is built through media campaigns, ISIS magazines and social networks. Indeed, many terrorist organizations rapidly understood the role of education in colonizing the young minds and heart with diverging’s ideas leading to a series of attacks on schools. As Gramsci explains, “counter- hegemonic resistance necessarily involves struggling over the hearts and minds of people, their attitudes, beliefs, and emotions about the world”.

As a result, the Gramscian perspective on terrorism allows for the understanding of the reasons of the terrorist occurrence. Indeed, understood as the contestation of the western hegemony experienced as an emotional/ cultural affect through terrorist tactics also questioning and sometimes transcending the acknowledged hegemonic positions within the current global structure of power.
Chloe Guyard graduated from Sciences Po Paris School of International Affairs in 2018. She thus has a Master of Arts (M.A) in International Security. Specialized in Diplomacy and South East Asian studies, her major remained security studies. During her schooling, she studied International Relations Theory (IRT) but also had the chance to access innovative courses. As such, she participated to a war simulation at Paris military School where she put herself in a political advisor’s shoes. After graduating from Sciences Po Paris, she pursued a Master of Arts in La Sorbonne Paris-IV. She is currently applying to the LSE International Relations’ doctoral program (2020-2021).

THE CHINESE ALTERNATIVE: SOCIALIZING STATES INTO COMPATIBLE ROLES

Dorothée Vandamme
Université de Mons (Belgium) Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium)

Recent developments in literature highlight that the power to recognize and legitimize is central to global power distribution, thereby emphasizing the relational dimension of power. In addition, current developments tend to favor non-Western views; among them are socialization and role theories, which by adopting a symbolic interactionist perspective, go beyond traditional Western approaches. Yet the concept of socialization still lacks conceptual clarity both in terms of processes and outcomes. Three questions arise from studying it: What is the content of political socialization? Who socialises whom? And how can we observe socialization? The model developed in this research differs from existing ones in its focus on ego-alter interaction. While socialization theories acknowledge that the end product of socialization results from the interaction between actors, little has been written on its content, in particular from a role theoretical perspective. Inferring from Maull’s assessment that “mutually supportive role conceptions encompass both ego and alter expectations, which need to be compatible to allow for effective cooperation”, I argue that a key factor of socialization is the compatibility or neutrality in the interaction of states’ national role conceptions combined with an explicit and understandable social message regarding role expectations and role demands. Accordingly, a country aiming to place itself in a position of superiority vis-à-vis one or several others will, in addition to increasing its material and immaterial capabilities, develop its social power by ensuring the compatibility of its national role conceptions with its significant others’. Specifically, it will ensure that the role conceptions of other countries are compatible with its own self-definition.

China’s emerging global actorness is a quest for great power legitimacy. The structuration of the international system is based on its members’ responses to Chinese and Western leadership in terms of validation or contestation. As China asserts its power, it gains greater legitimacy to socialize other countries into their achieved or ascribed status, thereby challenging Western-based norms and rules. In doing so, China guarantees that the roles self-defined by other countries are compatible to its own self-conceived roles. Thus, role compatibility is key to China’s international socialization strategy and to understand the challenges to Western-based rules. Nowhere is China’s ambition of becoming a leader more evident than in its region. China is making a benevolent use of its power because of normative convictions and strategic calculations. The very definition of China’s strategic narrative and ultimate objective places the country as the central authority in an otherwise equality-based community of states, the Tianxia system. In doing so, China defines its foreign policy so as to socialize its neighbours and partners into its world view, thereby ensuring that they perceive
China is redefining role interaction towards compatibility along three dimensions:

(1) Mimicking American leadership role conceptions. Beijing defends international norms, and uses them against the leader by developing a rhetoric of ‘rectification’ of the system: by pointing out American boundary-crossing behaviour and the need to abide by the rules, China calls for the need to modify an order that is, at times, violated by Western states. China grounds interstate relationality on the discourse on sovereignty as reflecting China’s peaceful and non-threatening rise to power. In doing so, Beijing questions the legitimacy of the leader, thereby constructing its own legitimacy as defender of systemic values — which is, in other words, compatible with the system.

(2) Adopting norm-making, by performing the roles of reformer and advocate of peaceful relations, to be “the principal source of the assumptions behind whatever normative accord can be found”. Beijing builds this role through a logic of relationships based on mutual interests, so as to project benevolence, through the expansion of a Chinese-inspired model of interstate relations of patronage politics. Primarily in the field of economics, China is asserting itself in other sectors as well (a sort of spill-over effect of socialization processes). Not only does China gain in legitimacy in other sectors thanks to its economic power, Beijing relies on this spillover dynamic to increase the socialization process of other states around its leadership.

(3) The mechanism of social identification that Beijing aims at triggering among Asian states so as to influence the creation of a group identity that would eventually prove cohesive enough to be stronger than the relations Eurasian countries maintain with the US.

The China-Pakistan relation illustrates a growing Eurasian geopolitical order which revolves around Beijing and questions American leadership. In a region marred by conflictuality and mistrust, the Beijing-Islamabad axis stands as an example of Chinese foreign policy to establish its leadership through normative and benevolent power. It also illustrates how Pakistan instrumentalizes the social intersubjectivity of the international order to navigate through (potential) socializers and seek validation for its roles. China-Pakistan history underlines strong ties and an even stronger political will to preserve these ties, by maintaining official exchanges, conducting joint military and anti-terrorism exercises, and deepening their security and economic cooperation. In many instances, China has provided Pakistan with assistance and support, bringing it political support at the international level, nuclear and other military assistance, and (promises of) economic investments that would, according to some accounts, put Pakistan on the fast-track to socio-economic development. China thereby validates Pakistan’s roles, and in some cases, encourages Islamabad to actively perform these roles.

Nonetheless the subjects that could oppose Islamabad and Beijing are deeply rooted, such as the Islamic identity of the first versus the communist nature of the second. Moreover, despite emphatic descriptions of their ‘all-weather friendship’, Pakistan remains firmly oriented towards the US in terms of security. More importantly, my research shows that Pakistan seeks its social validation from the US, and more generally Western countries, more than from China. This highlights that while China may be building its social power —arguably with more success since the arrival of the Trump administration in the White House— it still has a long way to go
to be recognized as the regional or systemic primary socializer.

Dr. Dorothée Vandamme is visiting lecturer in IR at the Université de Mons and the Université catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain), in Belgium. She got her PhD from UCLouvain and wrote her dissertation on Pakistan’s foreign policy, socialization and role theory. Dr. Vandamme is research associate at the Centre for the Study of Crises and International Conflicts (UCLouvain), Genesys Networks, and research fellow in the European Foundation for South Asian Studies. Her latest publication is Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New Cases, (co-edited with Struye de Swielande, Walton and Wilkins, Routledge, 2018).

THE END OF EVANGELICAL POLITICS?
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EVANGELICAL IDEOLOGY AS PORTRAYED BY EVANGELICAL POPULAR CULTURE, AND THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Anni Calcara
University of Eastern Finland

The evangelical Christians have achieved a position of power in the political arena of the United States by vigorously promoting their message through megachurches, government lobbyists, and consumer entertainment. They were the driving force behind the election of president Trump in 2016. However, Trump’s presidency challenges the foundation of the evangelical politics; the evangelical ideology. Consequently, I argue that the evangelical Christian are in a crisis, or at least they are clashing with their partner in politics, the Republican party, currently under siege by president Trump. Does this signify the end of the evangelical politics, thus, a change in the political hegemony of the United States?

First, I examine the evangelical ideology through a close reading of arguably one of the most influential pieces of evangelical popular culture, Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last Days by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins. The novel takes stands on various timely topics, however, here I address only two of them: relationship with Russia and policies concerning abortion. Second, I contrast LaHaye and Jenkins’s text to sources reflecting the policies of the Trump administration.

Russia. The most glaring contradiction between evangelical ideology presented in Left Behind and the Trump administration is the relationship with Russia. It is difficult to assess the opinion of the evangelical voters on the peculiar relationship of Trump and Russia, a country demonized in Left Behind and described as a grim, “vast tundra […] a great brooding giant with a devastated economy and regressed technology”. While LaHaye and Jenkins clearly express post-Cold War sentiment and gloat on the “victory” of the West (United States), Trump has a different approach. Instead of putting distance between him and Russia, Trump has not hidden his admiration of President Putin. Whether anyone involved in his 2016 presidential campaign colluded with the Russian government, the appearance of this being plausible is problematic. After the release of the Mueller report, the polls showed an all-time low support for Trump; the overall approval ratings varied between 39% and 50%, depending on the polling agency. However, 69% of the white evangelical voters still supported Trump in January 2019. Although the number is quite high, it has fallen significantly from 78% support measured in January 2017.
**Abortion.** During the presidency of George W. Bush (2001 – 2009), evangelicals had their say in ethical issues, when federal funding for stem cell research was significantly limited. Bush openly cited that his “position on these issues is shaped by deeply held beliefs”. Interestingly, Trump rarely talks about faith in public and seemingly does not consider it to be a basis of his policies. Nevertheless, it can be argued that after eight years of having “an ally” in the White House, the evangelicals felt threatened by the Obama administration and the “liberal agenda”. LaHaye and Jenkins outline their view of the “liberal” take on abortion in *Left Behind* through a discussion between the protagonist, Rayford, and Hattie, with whom Rayford almost has an affair with. In the exchange, Hattie (representing the liberal, secular society), tells Rayford that her sister, a nurse working in an abortion clinic, is upset. Rayford asks: “Are you saying that your sister is hoping women can get pregnant again so they’ll need abortions and she can keep working?”. Hattie utters a callous response: “But Rayford, that’s her job. […] They need unwanted pregnancies because that’s their business”. Not surprisingly, as a response, 81% of the white evangelical voters voted for Trump in 2016.

Thus, if we were to pose the question, why did the evangelicals vote for Trump, the simple answer would be that he was not a Democrat (or Hillary). Additionally, Trump was endorsed by several conservative political and religious figures, such as the former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, as well as the leader of the Liberty University, Jerry Falwell Jr. However, others, like Senator Ted Cruz, withheld theirs.

**2020.** In *Left Behind*, faith replaces skepticism. In 2020, the evangelicals have a choice either to retain faith in their current leaders or raise questions. Due to the discrepancy between his character and policies, and his apparent incapability to separate his private personality from his role as a president, Trump has divided the Christian Right, including the evangelicals. There is speculation whether Trump brings the alliance between the Republicans and the political activity of the Christian Right started in the 1980’s with the *Moral Majority* to an end. Whether this means the end of the evangelical politics in the United States, remains to be seen.

**Anni Calcara** is a doctoral student at the University of Eastern Finland (UEF), attending the program *Social and Cultural Encounters* (SCE). My dissertation “Impact *Left Behind*: Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins’s *Left Behind* franchise as an ideological and social phenomenon” examines the complex relationship between religious popular culture and ideology.
THE END OF THE DOLLAR HEGEMONY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICA AS A SUPER POWER

Fanit Izzeddine
Jijel University, Algeria

The emergence of the United States as the world’s hegemon dates back to the end of World War II. The country did not debouche from the war with no infrastructural demolition only, but it emerged as a global superpower whose economic, military and technological preponderance became unchallenged. Measuring national power is usually done through measuring the relative power of a given country in relation to other countries. Advanced technology, military might, gross domestic product, advanced infrastructure, think tanks are metrics, among many, by which we can measure the relative power of the US in relation to the belligerents of WWII whose economies were heavily destroyed by warfare.

Due to massive destruction of the British economy, replacing the pound sterling by another currency in the mechanisms of international trade settlements became a monetary necessity after the end of WWII in times when the US became the leading industrial nation possessing 50% of the globe’s wealth. The rise of Wall Street during 1920’s and the collapse of London as an international financial power during WWII led to the rise of the dollar, which dethroned the British sterling from being the intercontinental top reserve currency. The Bretton Woods system of 1944 instituted the American dollar as the world reserve currency and made it redeemable for gold at a consistent rate of $35. The dollar emerged as the most trustful currency in international trade because the American economy, unlike the Europeans’, was not damaged during the war. The post WWII economic explosion was a sort of economic growth, which made of the US a financial and economic superpower not only in the west but also in the whole world.

The success of the US to rise as the globe’s hegemon after WWII was not only due to its position as the leading industrial nation but was primarily due to its ability to translate its assets and capabilities into influence in its international relations. Amassing 70% of the world’s gold reserves permitted to the US to become the creditor for many countries around the globe because of its ability to lend huge amounts of money through Marshal Plan for the reconstruction of Europe. Acting as an international banker, the US flooded its dollars throughout the world and thus becoming the de facto international medium of economic exchange. The dollarization of the international markets allowed the US to turn its relative power in relation to other rival countries to usable power to exercise its hegemony in the complicated international political relations. The dollar hegemony was strengthened when Saudi Arabia, the biggest oil exporter, opted for dollars in its oil sales in 1974, which turned the American Financial institutions to the globe’s main creditors.

The policy of petrodollars turned the US into a unipolar hegemon in the international relations by using dollars as a foreign policy tool to impose sanctions on other countries in times of political and economic disputes. Since the end of WWII, the US imposed financial sanctions on many countries around the globe including Russia and china, which are regarded as the main challengers to its hegemony. Currently, The American Office of Foreign Assets Control lists more than 20 countries, which are subject to active sanction programs including Iran and
Russia. Multinational companies know that the dollar is the fuel of commerce and business around the globe and that any challenge to the US-led world order would mean losing access to dollars which holds 81% of international trade finance as to 2016.

The correlation between the US hegemony and the rise of the dollar as the international reserve currency is undoubtedly strong and therefore the protection of this hegemony goes through the preservation of the petrodollars. Any defect to this system would mean losing the ability to impose financial sanctions on countries that refuse to comply with US rules. Lately, China and Russia are challenging the American global financial hegemony by working together with other countries to escape the American payment system, which allows the latter to pose its hegemony on the international community. In Addition to the rise of Euro as an international currency, Russia along with the Eurasian Economic Union are planning to adopt a common currency in an attempt to create a dollar-free monetary union. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) are also seeking to launch a common digital currency for bilateral trade among member states.

The Chinese Yuan is the currency that will most likely to pose challenge to the dollar hegemony in the near future. The Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was established in 2016, counts 97 member states and functions primarily as a creditor to developing countries in Asia to help them build their national infrastructures. The establishment of the bank, though using the dollar currency, is an attempt from the Chinese Government to free its partners from the American world-led financial institutions and therefore from its hegemony and join its sphere of influence accordingly. Moreover, the Belt and the Road Initiative program, which is a Chinese long term project that aims at connecting more than 70 countries worldwide through connected infrastructure, aims primarily at attracting other countries into the Chinese orbit and that by providing loans from Chinese Banks.

Even though the dollar remains the main world reserve currency and the main foreign exchange currency as to 2018, the possibility to dethrone it from the top of the financial pyramid is still possible in the long run. Efforts from the Chinese and Russian governments to escape the dollarized world markets have been taking place recently in an attempt not only to escape the American dominance over the international financial institutions but also to wane the dollar hegemony and consequently the American hegemony since it is strongly correlated to the internationalization of its currency.

Fanit Izzeddine is an associate professor at the department of English, University of Jijel where he gives lectures in American Civilization to English Language third year students with a focus on American history and institutions and that since 2018. Fanit served as an assistant professor at the same University teaching writing skills for first year students between 2012 and 2017. Fanit received a B.A. in English Language from the University of Constantine in 2006 and a Master’s in American Civilization from the University of Annaba in Algeria. Fanit received a Ph.D. in American Civilization from the University of Tlemcen, Algeria in 2018. His main research interests include American history and institutions in addition to the American contemporary foreign politics. Fanit is the author of The Federal Reserve System and the Militarization of the American Foreign Politics (Idpublications 2006).
THE END OF WESTERN HEGEMONY? GERMAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE OIL CRISIS OF 1973

Ann-Judith Rabenschlag
Stockholm University

On October 6th, 1973, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel attempting to regain the territory which had been occupied by Israel six years earlier. Once again, the Israeli-Arab conflict had turned into a violent confrontation. As one result of the ongoing war, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided to continuously reduce oil extraction by 5% per month until Israel would have left all territories occupied in 1967 and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people would have been restored. Furthermore, the OAPEC countries raised the oil price until it had quadrupled in January 1974. The United States, the Netherlands and Portugal, which the OAPEC considered to be especially Israel-friendly, were banned with a complete oil embargo.

Even though the Arab-Israeli war and the measurements by the OAPEC states only triggered an economic crisis already in the making, the usage of the “Oil-weapon” by the Arab states was perceived as major threat in the West. The United States, Japan and Western Europe appeared to be unprepared both economically and mentally for the sudden shortage of oil deliveries. No concrete political strategies had been elaborated in advance to meet such an upcoming crisis. Furthermore, the oil crisis presented itself as just one piece of a more general crisis of the 1970s. Both contemporaries and researchers have considered the 1970s to be a turning point in Western postwar history. Eric Hobsbawm has spoken about “the Golden Age” ending in the middle of the 1970s, the French economist Jean Fourastié has coined the expression of the end of the ‘trente glorieuses.’ The seemingly unstoppable success of post-war capitalism and the attitude of consumerism had suffered a severe blow.

This case study is based on the assumption that the experience of crisis leads to an intensified recollection to one’s own identity. There exists a large amount of research dealing with the 1970s as a century of crisis. However, whether the 1970s, put in a broader historical context, should be considered a contemporary epochal threshold or whether such a denotation is exaggerating the economic, political and societal upheavals of this time period, is not decisive for this investigation, since a longue-durée perspective is not relevant for the research question in focus. Decisive is not the question how critical the oil crisis of 1973 indeed was for Western economies and societies but the fact that contemporaries experienced the oil crisis as profound.

The experience of dealing with a severe crisis was intensified in the West due to the fact that the threats were articulated by external players – suddenly, the West was confronted with its economic dependence on non-Western countries. The Occident seemed to be depending on the Orient – a region which (in the West) had been perceived as inferior to the West. Now the OAPEC proved to have emerged as an economic and political player which could not be ignored any longer. Several contemporary actors, not least the American foreign minister Henry Kissinger, experienced the oil crisis therefore as an existential problem as it challenged the entire Western model.
Heavily relying on oil import, West Germany belonged to those Western industrial countries which were severely affected by the oil crisis of 1973. A long-lasting recession ended the economic boom of the postwar period, unemployment rose, the number of unemployed quadrupled within only two years. Ordered by the German government, German motorways were closed on several Sundays, gasoline stations were shut down. Due to these interventions into daily life, the oil crisis was experienced drastically not only by political actors but also by the ordinary man. German media was stirring up panic wondering if German oil reserves would suffice to supply the German population with heat and light during the upcoming winter.

Starting off from using Western Germany as a case study, this study raises the question how the oil crisis of 1973 was perceived by influential German actors. Did the focus in German public debate lie on the economic crisis only or was the oil crisis also framed as “end of Western hegemony”? Which public actors discussed the crisis in regards to domestic problems, and which actors in terms of a crisis of a supranational community – be it the political community of the EC or the cultural community of “the West”?

This paper is not a finished article but presents the status quo of a larger research project on how postwar German society was constructing the West in connection with different alleged crisis situations. In the long run, the project opens up for a comparative approach analyzing whether or in how far different Western states reacted differently to the oil crisis concerning their understanding of a possible clash between Occident and Orient and an alleged end of Western hegemony.

Ann-Judith Rabenschlag: In 2014, I took my PhD in History at Södertörn University/Stockholm, writing a book on the perception of foreign workers in the GDR. In 2016, I was granted the International Postdoc of the Swedish Research Council. Since then I have been employed at Stockholm University conducting research on the concept of the West in contemporary German History.

THE END OF WESTERN POWERS? THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF POWER OF STATES.

Malwina Hopej
University of Wroclaw

In the meaning of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States the state as territorial compositions with defined territory, permanent population, sovereign governments, capacity to enter into relations with the other states. On the other hand, borders can separate national discourses or knowledge, referring to the critical approach. Ontological constructivism sees the world and political occurrences as resulting from the interactions of human beings that involve both material resources (exempli gratia military power, economic factors) and norms, meanings, discourses.

Power as well as globalization, is presumably undefinable concept. Critical geopolitics as defined by the threefold division – formal, practical, popular, analyses which particularly analyse discourses and representations such as disputations members of learned societies, politicians’ speeches, images in magazines, television the print press. This approach shows that power is not strictly gather as weapon of mass destruction, natural reserves, geographic space.
Power is, there again, ability to efficient creation of coverage, first and foremost. Establishment, affect to exterior audience perception of the world. Contemporarily does it signify power of states? In critical geopolitics the power and the analysis of the language (in particular seminal politicians’ speeches; as components of the concept of the linguistic worldview also ideation in minds of citizens) have an incredible impact on sovereignty, international recognition or else borders. There is no doubt about it that the notion of hegemony is the subsequent issue formed by them.

The hegemony of United States of America, comprehend as the superpower as well as a multiplication of great powers and sectoral powers, is incontrovertible. However, in theorization of multilateralism described as a historically order structured by American hegemony likewise (American) principles rely on promises implementation and observance of human rights, collective security, nondiscrimination in world trade. However, what about another powers – great powers and regional powers. Who and when will be able to surpass the potential of the United States of America? Statistics plus economic indicators to prove that in the space of a few years, Chinese economy will exceed American GDP whereas the Indian population (as one of component power in classical geopolitics view) will increase the People’s Republic of China citizens.

But, does it mean that these countries will become superpowers? Not necessarily, because the United States of America have something whereof either India or China do not gain – the hegemony position under examination not only in categories: classical geopolitics, critical geopolitics essentially presence – the concept broader than power. Therefore, up to the mark nearest the mass audiences internal also external, since the end of Second World War, America unwaveringly promote their national appointed elements of values, lifestyle, culture which become indicators of global universalism. For these reasons alone, in the space of a few years as well as in consciousness of global community favour cultural and language aspects (fundamental issues of critical geopolitics and soft power), the People’s Republic of China – with tradition collectivism as well as exclusiveness – will not become a universal hegemon. The Western hegemony can be assessed from the angle of existence great and regional Eurasian powers – first and foremost Great Britain, France, Germany. In my opinion scrutinise the declining years of these potentials. If we take development economies, especially in Africa into consideration, we become convinced that values offered by West cease to be desirable.

One of research methods serves for verification which states be able to have pretensions to being a hegemon (to paraphrase levels of power – the great hegemon on the supraregional plane) are scientific researches on perceived power. This speech is kept up the convention of critical constructivism, linguistic turn or else critical constructivism. This one exemplifies and introduces to one of many models measure perceived powers of nation states. My own approach to the subject forecasts combination of linguistic (ethnolinguistic) and geopolitical methods, nevertheless the address presents the part of the results of a questionnaire survey conducted in the United States of America on research sample (500 citizens). The number of respondents corresponds to the rules adopted in to selected research methods: exempli gratia Polish ethnolinguistic school of Lublin, where the special research sample consists of at least 100 respondents to group into categories on account of sex and education (the arts or else the sciences). Subsequent part of empirical research delineates concern to geopolitics codes (“the manner in which a state orientates itself to the world”) as well as image the map of world
powers defined as the creation of the hierarchy of regional / local powers, great powers, sectoral powers.

The first item describes and analyse the hierarchy of power of states in the Eurasian Region – regional / local powers, small powers and non-significant states. Most of the American respondents feel that the current order maintains historical orders in this region. However, perception on Russian power is very thought-provoking. The second part consists of great powers capable of transgress the borders of regions. This chapter presents whether in American respondents opinion supervened the end of Western geopolitical hegemony. States possess hegemonial tradition as Germany or France do not hold the high positions in the ranking of overall powers. Not necessarily in American perception the rising powers exempli gratia India, Brazil or else the Republic of South Africa are continually categorized as contenders for regional powers. More powerful states surpass this trinity in potential. The third part of empirical research presents great sectoral powers from defined perspective – respondents took cognizance of own definitions of economic power, military power, political power, soft power.

Malwina Hopej is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Studies, University of Wroclaw. Her doctoral research investigates the perceived power and potential of the United States of America. Her research interests focuses on critical geopolitics, constructivism, the linguistic turn, the concept of the linguistic worldview.

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CAN THE WEST STILL PRETEND TO LEAD?

Marie-Josée Lavallée
University of Montreal (Canada)

The post-1989 belief that free markets and democracy would drag all peoples and countries of the world on the path of progress, freedom, and equality, which went hand in hand with the motto “there is no alternative”, has had its day. Yearly empirical data-based reports raise the alarm: democracy and freedom are in retreat, and infringements on human rights are more and more blatant throughout the world. Regressions have been registered for more than a decade, but the situation worsened these years. The fact that major setbacks are observed within the West’s “older democracies”, the very ones which have striven to “export” their model of democracy, is especially disturbing for analysts.

Democracy as a given institutional setting and set of practices and procedures is a Western invention. Western-centrists never miss an opportunity to remind that democracy first appeared in Greece (as direct democracy), got out of history’s limbo around the middle of the 18th century in the West, where it also developed toward parliamentarianism (from constitutional monarchies) and electoral-representative democracy throughout the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. As the beginning of this era also coincides with major social, technological, cultural and economic changes in the West, gathered under the label of modernity, democracy naturally becomes part of this Western socio-cultural compound.

As many regions and countries of the world remained under formal imperialist yoke until the aftermath of the Second World War, they were prevented from shaping independent political institutions of their own, even though some were allowed by colonial powers to develop a form
of political activity beforehand (movements and parties for instance). For this reason, the “waves” of democratization which occurred after 1945 will mostly involve former countries and regions which suffered Western direct imperialism or colonization. The superpowers’ struggle for influence in the context of the Cold War will have an impact on the economic and political developmental trajectories of these countries, facing the immense task of building institutions from scratch and often lacking the means to do so. The United States, backed by international institutions and followed by a couple of Western countries, will sponsor – especially for geostrategic reasons – development enterprises, which will be aligned to the modernization ideology. The latter was based on the idea that there’s a unique path of development, the West’s, which all countries only have to replicate. From the 1950s, this path was especially tied to economic performance and industrialization, and to a certain extent, to democracy, all components of Western modernity. Democratization, however, remained a second rank requirement at this time, since Western powers did not refrain from supporting authoritarian and dictatorial regimes whenever this promotes their geostrategic objectives or economic interests. Nonetheless, the spreading and development of democracy in non-Western countries was already embedded in Western forms, values, “language”, and imaginary.

Most democracies founded after 1989 were “West-sponsored”, that is, their implementation was strongly encouraged by older, Western, democracies. The United States, as the sole remaining superpower at that time, still being a leader on the international scene in many respects (on the military, economic, and technological levels, for instance), and because of its overwhelming influence on key international institutions was indeed, in a strong position to shape, at least, to influence, domestic political destinies. The sole superpower of the time didn’t refrain from using military means of persuasion when needed, let alone, economic. The European Union will take the relay especially in former Communist countries.

The wars waged by the United States and their repeated foreign interventions, often justified in the name of democracy and human rights, and which reached a high point after 2001, are not the sole factor that darkened the shining sky of the freshly “freed” world within a few years. In fact, as early as in the 1990s, analysts were concerned about already visible signs of stagnation and malfunctioning in numbers of democracies created after 1989, and even feared developments toward authoritarian regimes. A decade later, against all odds, it was the older Western democracies, and even the self-proclaimed champion of democracy, the United States, which became sources of concern.

This dark picture doesn’t miss raising a huge number of questions. “Are we witnessing the swan song of democracy?” is the probably the first coming to mind, and the most difficult to answer. I will tackle with this general question from a specific angle, sketching paths of reflection on the following issue. If democracy is to endure, it will have to renew itself, since scholars and the general public agree that actual democracy is in crisis. In this case, will the renewal result from result from Western initiatives, in line with the logic of previously “Western-sponsored” democratizations? Moreover, could we consider that the West has a “monopoly” on democracy, on its forms and on democratic developments? While recent regressive tendencies already suggest a negative answer to both questions, mere impressions are not enough. The perspective I will develop on this issue will be mainly theoretical, relying on the combined outlooks of history, political philosophy and sociology, rather than on case studies, which are
less convenient for generalizations. My reflection will also be guided by empirical data on democracy and freedom.

The first step will consist in distinguishing different meanings, processes and experiences grouped under the general heading “democracy”. Since there exists a wide range of competing conceptions of democracy, making explicit the constellation of institutional settings, practices, norms and values I hold constitutive of democracies, and which will be at the basis of my interrogation of the past, present, and future of democracy, of its impediments and prospects, is a mandatory step. While claiming that democracy is dynamic and processual rather than static may sound banal, this dimension is obscured or at best, implicit, in most studies. If the poverty of our language describing democracy does not help, it is symptomatic of a lack of proper acknowledgement to this dimension. Democracy is constantly prone to swing between improvement and worsening, and its improvement, I believe, is strongly influenced by people’s involvement or apathy. Among the factors endangering democracy, studies rightly point out social fractures induced by race, gender, and social status, but I will argue that economic inequality, which does not attract the attention it deserves, may be even more crucial. Economic inequalities, in addition, are often at the root of other sources of inequality.

To the general and theoretical set of impediments distinguished in the first part, will be added various empirical obstacles pertaining especially to democratization and to democracy’s development and endurance in non-Western societies in the second section of this paper. A brief historical survey of the so-called third wave of democratization pointing out a range of factors which may explain the unfortunate fate of most democracies founded then, will contribute to identify these impediments. I will expose the reasons why democracy, just as “development”, does not consist in a ready-made model which can be transplanted, replicated, in any cultural setting, and no matter the local conditions, whose range extends from the mere material ones (like economic level, previous political institutional setting) to the most abstract conditions (like values, beliefs, and the imaginary). In the same vein, democracy cannot endure when deployed as an ideological weapon designed to promote or protect major Western powers’ interests. Also, when democracies are not more than “democracies by name”, that is, when they serve as a label to hide and legitimize highly elitist and often, authoritarian regimes, democracy may even prove more harmful for peoples that blatant authoritarianism. One may suspect that these ideological distortions of democracy are not unconnected to a recently well-spread popular hate of democracy.

In the last section of this paper, I will assess the issue of the future of democracy in the world, by focusing on two trends brought to light by recent empirical data. The first is signs democratization’s progresses in a couple of non-Western countries, which occur in parallel to the regressions observed in the West. The second trend, the rise of social movements and of participation, may confidently be considered among the factors explaining the former. I will explain, by relying on sociological and philosophical studies, why social movements and peoples can be a crucial force not only in “salvaging” democracies, but in revitalizing them, and even, in pushing forward the democratization process. To support the possibility that popular action can be more natural to democracy than a set of procedures and decisions imposed from above, one only has to remind oneself the original definition of democracy, as the “power of the people, by the people and for the people”. If an ongoing democratization process is at the heart of democracy, and if this process, in the first place, relies on the people, nothing is less sure than the renewal of democracy will come from the West. Democracy is not restricted to
the Western formal paradigm. Since democracy, at the basis, is a way of being and acting - which does needs organization and an institutional base at a certain point -, rooted in the will to autonomy, an aspiration which is not culturally exclusive, democracy can assume a wide range of shapes, molded after the culture, experiences and history of peoples striving for it.

Marie-Josée Lavallée is lecturer at the Department of History at University of Montreal (Canada). She teaches contemporary European history, international history, and globalization. She also lectures on political philosophy at the Department of Philosophy and Applied Ethics at University of Sherbrooke (Canada). She published a book on Hannah Arendt (2018) and a couple of articles on the same author and other German thinkers, as well as a book chapter on revolution in German thought of the postwar era (forthcoming, 2019). Her current book project is devoted to democracy and political change in local and global perspective.

THE HISTORICAL MULTICULTURAL TURN IN THE FINNISH NAME LEGISLATION: TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY MEETS THE GLOBAL INTERACTION

Sofia Kotilainen
University of Jyväskylä

In my presentation, I will study the long-term history of the “rapid change” in the Western cultural and societal hegemonies of name-giving and name legislation in the 21st century: how network communication, global interaction, gender equality and immigration have changed traditional Finnish personal names, fashions and norms of naming in the last years. The breaking of cultural hegemonies of traditional Lutheran naming practices and for example immigration from especially the eastern cultures effect in diverse ways on naming. The (un)official norms and practices of naming describe not only the preferences of the child’s parents or the authorities in the choice of names, but also many current ideologies, values, identities, cultural hegemonies and other mentalities, which can be discovered when the naming is studied from the viewpoint of the long-term historical research.

Name-giving is a linguistic form of social control. Until the 20th century naming represented the local community’s unofficial control in Finland. There was also some official control over the naming of peasant children exerted by the authorities, usually local ones like the parish priests. Particularly in eastern Finnish families, the Evangelical-Lutheran naming culture was traditionally patriarchal. Name-giving was considered above all to be the duty and right of the father of the family, and the primarily patrilineal transmission of names has been emphasised in previous research. However, the material relating to the families studied here reveals that there was also a place in the family for names inherited through the female line.

Historically, the ways of Finnish name-giving have been quite strictly based on the hegemonic Christian and especially Lutheran naming culture. Ever since the Finnish were subjects of the Swedish realm, the Lutheran Church and its clergy had until the 20th century supervised the propriety of the name choice, both the forenames and surnames. However, the first Finnish Names Act (surnames) was enacted only in the 1920s. Although the local naming traditions and practices could be divided in Eastern and Western Finnish naming culture, majority of the Finns belonged to the sphere of Western (i.e. Lutheran) naming culture.
I have researched the naming practices and use of names over as many as nine or ten generations in order to find out the attitudes and values behind the name-giving practices of the families studied. I have also followed the continuities and changes that appeared, when individualization and the modern civic society have gradually displaced the hereditary customs of the traditional agrarian society and weakened the social control of the local community. Since the practice of giving a new-born child a name inherited from the kin was especially prevalent in the early modern period and right up to the 20th century, it is important to analyze name-giving through kinship and the meanings attached to it. By inherited names I mean the old naming practice by which children received the same Christian names as their closest relatives and names were passed on from one generation to the next, but the families I have studied had also inherited surnames.

Early modern naming customs were generally closely linked to gender. As a social phenomenon the process of defining gender began already in early childhood. Christian forenames were quite strictly divided into women's and men's names. It was not until the period from the 1920s to the 1940s that laws regulating the choice and use of personal names for the whole population were enacted in Finland. Previously, it had been possible to choose names quite freely as long as they were not unethical or against the Christian faith.

The choice of forename is one of the first significant factors that define a person's gender and shape his or her identity. The gendered naming practices effectively expressed an individual's position in the early modern hierarchical community. Thus they also shaped her or his identity and reputation. For a long time, there was a kind of uniform naming culture in Finland, because over 90 per cent of the population were members of the Evangelical-Lutheran church, and it was not after the 1950s when the society was modernized and urbanized. Traditional practices were abandoned quite late, and for example inherited forenames are still commonly used at the beginning of the 21st century. Moreover, most Finns still have patrilineal surnames.

In the 21st century, the increasing individualism has loosened the regulation of the norms of naming. The new Finnish name legislation (since 1st January 2019) contains many great changes compared with the traditional ways of naming in Finland, and therefore one might call it as a historical turn in the Finnish tradition of naming norms and the choice of names of the Finnish people. It is now possible to give a child altogether four forenames instead of earlier maximum three and two surnames, one from both parent's side. If we compare the new norms of naming with those of earlier centuries, freedom of choice was increased in the new legislation and the new law takes into consideration both multiculturalism and families of the different kind.

**Sofia Kotilainen** (PhD, MSc, Docent) is working as a senior researcher in the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. In her doctoral dissertation, she studied naming practices in Finnish rural family communities, the ways of thinking that they reveal and personal names as cultural symbols that constituted immaterial capital in local social relations. Her current research interests include also history of literacy skills, education and libraries, as well as family and cultural history.
THE LEFT IN THE RHETORIC OF THE UNITED STATES REPUBLICAN PARTY

Annariina Seppänen
University of Oulu

The seven decades after the end of the Second World War have been a triumph for the Western liberal democracies. The West, led by the hegemonic United States, built a liberal international order that emphasised the importance of multilateral institutions, alliances, economic openness, democratic solidarity and security cooperation. After the end of the Cold War, the West and its liberal order expanded geographically and functionally. However, now it seems that Western liberalism is at retreat and the Western liberal world order is “suffering from an internal crisis of legitimacy”. Many scholars argue that the greatest threat to the West is not, after all, coming from outside but rather from inside the Western nations. In recent years, the United States has been inclined to disengage from the liberal international order it built. Overall, it seems that the unity of the West is shaken. This can be seen between the Western countries but also, and perhaps more importantly, within them. In the United States, the lack of unity and solidarity manifests itself, for instance, as political polarisation and as a growing intolerance towards people with differing opinions. This paper focuses on polarisation and political ideology in the United States. It also addresses the question whether liberalism is at retreat in the United States.

Polarisation in the American two-party system is nothing new, but several studies show that the polarisation and partisan politics in the United States have become accentuated during the past decades. The 2016 presidential election season and the 2018 mid-term elections underlined that there are deep divisions in the political landscape of the United States of America. The country is divided into Republicans and Democrats as well as conservatives and liberals who have competing views on what America should be like. Recent surveys show that the members of both political parties have become more ideologically consistent and a growing number of Americans have an unfavourable view of the opposing party. It seems that the people at the opposite ends of the political spectrum have very little tolerance for each other’s point of views and values. Partisanship is contributing to the lack of unity and solidarity among the Americans. The polarisation in the US is evident both at the elite level as well as among the public. Without a doubt, the domestic disputes, polarisation and the lack of bipartisan decision-making can complicate and weaken not only the role and reliability of the United States as the leader of the Western liberal order but also the viability of the liberal West itself.

When studying the political polarisation in the United States, it should not be overlooked what kind of language the political elites employ when referring to their political opponents. Therefore, this study focuses on how discourses contribute to polarisation. This paper examines the rhetoric in the Republican Party primary election debates as well as in the Republican Party Platforms in 2000–2016. The focus is on how the Republican Party and the Republican presidential hopefuls refer to the Democratic Party, the Democratic political ideology as well as the Democratic opponents in their rhetoric. More specifically, the paper investigates, through a careful analysis of words, phrases and discourses, how the political right in the United States constructs the image of the political left in their rhetoric and how the relationship between the two parties and their respective political ideologies is portrayed in
the Republican Party rhetoric. The rhetoric in the primary campaigns will be compared and contrasted with each other and the possible differences and development will be analysed. Although the focus is on the rhetoric of the Republican Party, the Democratic Party primary election debates and Party Platforms will also be looked at in order to gain a more comprehensive view of the US political debate and polarisation. Overall, the aim of this paper is to examine whether and how polarisation is produced at the elite level in political campaign communication.

This paper is a part of my ongoing doctoral research focusing on the status and development of American conservatism in the rhetoric of the Republican Party primary election debates in 2000, 2008, 2012 and 2016. The research focuses on how political ideology is expressed and reproduced in communication. The primary election debates are an important part of the American political process and they are followed by millions of people and covered actively in the news media. Consequently, the debates have a huge potential for influence and they play an important role in shaping the American political reality. Naturally, as the leading superpower of the world and the West, the values and ideology of the US leadership have a notable effect on world politics in the international arena.

Annariina Seppänen (MA in English Philology and History) is a doctoral student at the University of Oulu Graduate School, Finland. Her dissertation focuses on American conservatism in the rhetoric of the Republican Party primary election debates in 2000–2016. She is interested in how political ideology is expressed and reproduced in communication. At the moment, her research is funded by the Finnish Concordia Fund.

**The Remaking of Global Order after World War I: Carl Schmitt’s Grossraumordnung and Hannah Arendt’s Federalism**

Ville Suuronen
University of Helsinki

This paper compares Carl Schmitt’s and Hannah Arendt’s historical narratives of the decline of the Westphalian nation-state model in the modern period and examines the different ways these authors aimed to rethink the global political order throughout the last century. It is argued that Schmitt and Arendt offer two radically different readings of Western political history and two equally different proposals for rethinking international relations from a new kind of pluralistic perspective that is no longer defined by an uncontested European hegemony.

In different ways, both Schmitt and Arendt both saw the first world war as a decisive turning point in Western history. For Schmitt, the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the creation of the League of Nations and the tumultuous Weimar Republic were all symptoms of a new kind of global politics that was beginning to take shape during the early twentieth century. According to Schmitt, since the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Utrecht (1713), European politics had been defined by a balance of powers that had enabled wars-in-form and hindered them from turning into wars of destruction. In the interwar world, this order was now being threatened by the American brand of liberalism and humanitarianism. At the eve of the second world war, Schmitt envisioned a world order that would no longer be dominated by homogeneous nation-
states, but rather by a plurality of “large spaces” (Grossräume): culturally and ideologically unified political spaces that were each dominated by a leading empire.

For Arendt, the last century appeared in a very different light. Although also Arendt noted that the first world war had already left the heritage of the Western tradition largely meaningless, for her, this was nothing more than the prologue for what was to come. In Arendt’s narrative of Western political modernity, it was the development of totalitarian movements and their crimes against humanity that marked the decisive moment of no return. In contrast to Schmitt’s vision, Arendt turned to a vision of a new kind of global politics that would utilize federative political models and make use of participatory democracy, thus turning to ideas which we much discussed among the European resistance movements against fascism and Nazism.

The aim of this paper is to examine in detail how both Schmitt and Arendt delved into the tradition of Western thought and political history in order to understand the roots and elements of these modern political developments and to explore how they used these narratives to imagine alternative political futures that would no longer be Euro-centric, but rather based on a new kind of political pluralism.

Ville Suuronen is a PhD student in EuroStorie’s subproject 1, Law and the Uses of the Past. He has a background in philosophy and his expertise lies in political theory and intellectual history. In his doctoral dissertation he examines and compares the political theories of Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) and Carl Schmitt (1888–1985).

**WRITING YOUR OWN HISTORY: THE IMPORTANCE OF REFUGEE NARRATIVES IN A TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT**

Iris-Aya Laemmerhirt
TU Dortmund

It is often assumed that history is written by those who win the wars. Indeed, when looking at history writing, it becomes clear that most accounts focus on Western perceptions of significant events, hence enforcing Western perspectives and ideologies. The result of is that more often than not binary oppositions of the East and the West are created. Yet, in our globally interconnected world, it becomes increasingly important to shift away from such binary narrative approaches, which cannot account for complex cross-cultural histories and relations.

The extent to which a rather one-sided representation can alter history writing and understanding, becomes evident when looking at the Second Indochina War, also known as the “Vietnam War” in the Western world or “the Resistance War Against America” in Vietnam. The different names of this military conflict already suggest that this war (just as any other war) has been perceived differently by the different parties that were involved. Hence, while the United States dominantly creates a narrative that focuses on the Vietnam War as a “just” war against Communism, in which America aided South Vietnam, from a Vietnamese perspective,
the US involvement is perceived as a result of the long colonial history of Vietnam, a history dominated by suppression and exploitation of the Asian nation by the West.

It is striking that although the U.S. lost this war, the most prominent narratives were and still are produced in the United States. Especially movies such as *Apocalypse Now* (1979), *The Deer Hunter* (1978), *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989), or *When We Were Soldiers* (2002) alongside literary texts such as *The Quiet American* (1955) and *Dispatches* (1977) continue to shape narratives of this military conflict. All of these texts turn the war mainly into an American tragedy, reducing the role of both North as well as South Vietnamese people to silenced subsidiary characters of bloodthirsty foes or, at best, helpless victims.

However, most recently, refugee writers and artists such as Viet Thanh Nguyen, Thi Bui, Krysada Binly Panusith Phounsiri, and Bryan Thao Worra have started to offer their different perspectives on this conflict, thereby challenging and countering Western hegemonic narratives. Their novels, graphic memoirs, and poems evidence the complexity of the conflict and its aftermath from the perspective of those who have suffered as civilian victims.

This paper will argue that the refugee narrative, a genre that has not yet been defined as a literary genre, is crucial within the field literary studies in general and American studies in particular, as these narratives counter dominant Western perspectives and force readers to question their perceptions. Especially in an American context, the acknowledgement of refugee narratives being different from immigrant narratives is crucial. Viet Thanh Nguyen, for example, insists on being called a refugee, not an immigrant. Nguyen explains his stance with the fact that while the immigrant idea and the myth of the United States being an immigrant nation persists, refugees are often associated with “fear, failure, and flight” and hence rendered “un-American” (Nguyen). By implication, this means that refugees are denied agency and a place within the larger American national narrative.

Closely investigating Viet Thanh Nguyen’s Pulitzer Prize winning novel *The Sympathizer* (2015), it will be argued that this novel does not only deconstruct Orientalist ideas of a progressive West and backward East but also further question the act of history writing itself. Employing (mainly) a North Vietnamese first person narrator, who recounts the Vietnam War and its aftermath, the novel forces its reader to actively and critically engage with the narrative. Since the unnamed protagonist, a double-agent and spy, is a highly unreliable narrator, the reader is very much aware from the very beginning of the narrative that whatever (hi)story is told, it has to be approached very critically. Such a critical reading and evaluation of provided information is still missing when it comes to accounts of war, especially written from a first person perspective. As a spy and refugee in the United States, the narrator further represents America not only as a country of opportunity and a multicultural melting pot, but rather as a materialistic, often racist and ignorant wasteland. Deconstructing the most dominant Western myth of the United States as the country where everyone can pursue his/her happiness, the narrator paints a very different image of America, experienced from an Indochinese refugee perspective. At the same time, the novel gives voice to a group of people that is usually marginalized and remains unheard.
Thus, this paper argues that *The Sympathizer* demands a radical rethinking and reevaluation of America’s role in the Second Indochina War as well as its aftermath by contesting and re-examining the dominant Western narrative of this conflict. Furthermore, the novel emphasizes the importance of refugee narratives and to shift perspectives in order to gain a more differentiated perspective on historical conflicts.

**YOUNG FINNISH PEOPLE OF MUSLIM BACKGROUND EXPLORING THEIR SPACES AND SENSE OF BELONGING**

Helena Oikarinen-Jabai

In my presentation I will discuss the participatory research project *Young Muslims and Resilience* (2016-2018, University of Helsinki, funded by Kone Foundation), focusing especially on the art exhibition, which was organized as part of the project. In the art exhibition eighteen young adult participants/co-researchers with a Muslim background participated in exploring their relationship to Islam by creating productions such as video and textile installations, photo collages, paintings, calligraphy and poetry. The art works dealt with multiple issues, for example faith, dialogues between religious communities, gender, belonging and sexual diversity.

My presentation will concentrate on number of works by those the participants who has stated that they leaned on Sufism or spirituality in their working processes or whose works expressed qualities that may be reflected through the spectrum in which rhizomes of Sufi ways of understanding human existence in the world are present. In their art works the participants initiated multiple ways to approach belonging, tradition and the knowledge that being in between different cultural, religious, gender and other normative positions enabled them to explore. Referring to spirituality, Islamic mystics and Sufism helped them to present narratives and stories in which they could challenge the dogmatic ideas of religion, reconstruct their personal relationship with Islam and create fresh ideas about their own spaces and sense of belonging. I interpret this also as being linked to ‘post’ ideas of hybrid transformative cultural and metaphoric spaces as paths to create new forms and understanding of our embodied realms, expressions, beliefs and subject position.

In addition, I suggest that by leaning on Sufism the participants could refer to common roots of Middle-Eastern and Asian religions and our philosophical heritage. When creating the research methodology I was supported by the notion of “unfinished knowledge”, created by Nira Yuval-Davis, which recognizes the epistemological standpoints of different research participants as part of the research process. The idea of unfinished knowledge originates in Martin Buber’s notion of dialogue, in which “I” encounters another person not as an objectified “it” but rather as part of an interconnected “I-Thou” relationship.

As the participants brought up Sufism, exploring it in their works, I found that Sufi philosophy and practices were in many ways related to the ideas that Buber developed in his book *I and Thou*. This was to be expected because Buber’s work uttered a desire to go back to the roots of Judaism, before the Talmud, and maybe even before the
prophet Moses. Furthermore, it is well known that the mysticism of all Middle-Eastern
religions has common roots and is influenced by Hinduism and other Asian religions.
Buber also discusses Hinduism and Buddhism in opening the understanding of the
reciprocity of the I-Thou relation.

In his book *Sufism and Surrealism* the Syrian-born writer and poet Adonis compares these
two isms, formed at different times in human history. He claims that both Sufism and
Surrealism answered the needs of their own times to understand the unspoken, the
unseen and the unknown questions that reason, religious orthodoxy or science could not
explain. The ultimate goal of the Sufi is to become one of the absolute, invisible. The
Surrealist is also interested in the nature of the absolute that may be God, reason, matter
itself thought or spirit. Both paths lead to a “return that assumes an alteration in the one
who is at the same time returning to and merging with the origin” (Adonis). Both Sufism
and Surrealism also emphasise artistic and poetic expression as a route to Oneness as
well as touching that which seems impossible to touch.

By using art, the participants could trace and embody some of humankind’s common
historical narrations, and in this way also question the duality and confrontation
embedded in Western thinking and religious and scientific practices. Moreover, their art
works opened landscapes for interchanges between Muslim believers and people with
different religions and worldviews. This kind of rupturing of common categorizations and
given subject positions may be a beginning not only for new stories, images and
encounters, but also for the sharing of the fact that in order to survive on this globe we
human beings have to leave behind the narrowminded hegemony of any religious,
political and national ideas, and open a dialogue that will help us to find new approaches,
communities and discourses in the world we live in.
Map of Jyväskylä with key places of conference: https://goo.gl/maps/evSYuQ529Rd42s3x7

QR code to map:

CONTACT INFORMATION

- Contact the conference organizers at westernhegemonies@gmail.com
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